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Abstract 
The JRC PESETA IV study shows that ecosystems, people and economies in the EU will face major impacts from 
climate change if we do not urgently mitigate greenhouse gas emissions or adapt to climate change. The burden 
of climate change shows a clear north-south divide, with southern regions in Europe much more impacted, 
through the effects of extreme heat, water scarcity, drought, forest fires and agriculture losses. Limiting global 
warming to well below 2°C would considerably reduce climate change impacts in Europe. Adaptation to climate 
change would further minimize unavoidable impacts in a cost-effective manner, with considerable co-benefits 
from nature-based solutions.   
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Executive summary 
 
Policy context and purpose 
Climate change is one of the biggest threats for humanity, seriously affecting people and nature. With the Green 
Deal for Europe the EU strives for keeping our planet healthy and aspires to become the first carbon-neutral 
continent in the world by 2050. Despite this ambition and the target of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change1 
to keep global warming well below 2°C compared to pre-industrial temperatures, greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions worldwide are still growing. Global temperature is now around 1°C higher compared to the 
preindustrial era and if adequate mitigation strategies are not introduced, global warming could reach 3°C or 
more by the end of this century.  
The primary purpose of the PESETA IV study is to better understand the implications of climate change for the 
EU. Looking at a range of impact categories this report communicates what sectors and regions of the EU could 
be most affected and how mitigation and adaptation options can avoid the adverse effects of climate change.  
 
Scenario design 
PESETA IV evaluates the benefits (avoided negative impacts) of reducing GHG emissions and the potential of 
adaptation measures at EU sectoral level. For this, it quantitatively assesses sectoral climate change impacts 
(damages) in the future when mitigation and adaptation policy actions take place compared to a situation where 
no policy actions are undertaken. For the scenario without climate policy actions, impacts are assessed at global 
warming of 3°C and no adaptation. The mitigation benefits of achieving the Paris warming targets are evaluated 
by estimating impacts with 1.5°C and 2°C global warming.  
The evaluation of socioeconomic impacts is made within a specific setting of the state of the economy. That 
can be static (the economy as of today) or dynamic (the economy of the future). Results of the static approach 
show how global warming and climate change would impact today’s population and economy. This allows to 
single out the effect of climate change and avoids to make assumptions of demographic and economic 
developments over long time spans, which are highly uncertain. In the dynamic approach, the economy of the 
future is based on ECFIN Ageing Report projections of population and economy. Most of the analyses follow the 
static and dynamic approach, while the assessment of the overall effect on the economy is based on a static 
general equilibrium model for today’s economy.  
For some key impacts of global warming, like coastal flooding due to rising sea levels, the costs and benefits 
of adaptation options are explicitly modelled. For other sectors this is currently not feasible at pan-European 
scale and adaptation options are considered by reviewing the available literature.  
 
Impact categories 
PESETA IV assesses the consequences of climate change for eleven climate impact categories: human mortality 
from heat and cold waves, windstorms, water resources, droughts, river flooding, coastal flooding, wildfires, 
habitat loss, forest ecosystems, agriculture and energy supply. The project uses a combination of process-based, 
empirical, and multi-commodity market models that translate high-resolution projections of climate conditions 
corresponding to different global warming levels into biophysical and economic impacts.  
 
Interpretation of the results  
The study includes as many climate change impacts as feasible at present, but is not comprehensive in terms 
of the broad range of potential consequences of climate change. Key impacts not studied include those related 
to aquatic and marine ecosystems, water- and vector-borne diseases, air quality, displacement of people, 
conflicts and security, the irreversible damage to nature and species losses, and the potentially daunting 
consequences of passing climate tipping points. The effects of extreme events are also not fully captured in all 
covered sectors, such as those of heat stress on crop yields and droughts on energy production.  
                                           
1 Adoption of the Paris Agreement FCCC/CP/2015/L.9 (UNFCC, 2015). 
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This implies that the biophysical and economic impacts quantified in PESETA IV serve as a lower bound of the 
potential impacts of climate change in the EU. This study should therefore not be interpreted as a complete 
assessment of the benefits of climate mitigation and adaptation actions in the EU, which could be larger than 
those presented in this report.  
Extensive review reports on the potential impacts of climate change, like the IPCC Assessment Reports, cover a 
wider range of impacts based on numerous studies. The added value of PESETA IV is that it uses a consistent 
set of socioeconomic and climate scenarios that allows comparisons of impacts across sectors and regions of 
the EU to be made.  
Estimates reported in this report are inherently uncertain due to uncertainties in climate and socioeconomic 
projections, the biophysical and economic models implemented and the data used to conceptualise and validate 
them. Estimates presented herein should thus not be interpreted as forecasts or definitive predictions of future 
impacts for a particular place, region or country. Rather, they aim to provide insights regarding the general 
patterns of climate change impacts across the EU and the potential benefits of climate policy actions.  
 
Key findings 
Ecosystems, people and economies in the EU are projected to face major impacts from unmitigated climate 
change  
Without climate mitigation (warming of 3°C or more above pre-industrial temperature) and adaptation 
actions the EU could face the following impacts: 
 The alpine tundra domain would contract by 84% and practically disappear in the Pyrenees. The natural 
climatic tree line would shift vertically up by up to 8 m/year.  
 Ecological domains would shift northwards, resulting in severe changes of the prevailing domains in 
southern Europe and Boreal areas and the encroachment of the Tropical domain in Europe.  
 Wildfire and pest outbreaks would become more frequent and severe, increasing biomass loss and 
carbon release. 
 An additional 15 million Europeans living in the proximity of wildland would be exposed to high-to-
extreme fire danger for at least 10 days/year.   
 Each year nearly 300 million citizens in the EU and UK would be exposed to deadly heatwaves, resulting 
in a 30-fold rise in deaths from extreme heat (90,000 annual deaths compared to around 3,000 each 
year today).  
 Water resources availability would drop by up to 40% in southern regions of Europe and droughts would 
happen more frequent in most of southern and western Europe.  
 Water scarcity and drought would increasingly affect agriculture, energy production and water supply in 
regions that already suffer from water stress.  
 In the absence of international market adjustments, crop yields would drop by more than 10% in 
southern Europe.  
 Total drought losses for the EU and UK would increase to nearly 45 €billion/year with 3°C warming in 
2100 compared to 9 €billion/year at present.    
 Almost half a million people in the EU and UK would be exposed to river flooding each year, or nearly 
three times the number at present, and river flood losses would rise 6-fold in magnitude, reaching nearly 
50 €billion/year with 3°C in 2100. 
 Coastal flood losses in the EU and UK would grow by two orders of magnitude and climb to 250 
€billion/year in 2100, while 2.2 million people would be exposed per year to coastal inundation compared 
to 100,000 at present.    
 If 3°C global warming would occur in today’s economy, annual welfare loss in the EU and UK could 
represent 1.4% of GDP, when considering a limited set of climate impacts (river flooding, coastal 
flooding, agriculture, droughts, energy supply, mortality from temperature extremes, and windstorms). 
With 4°C global warming annual welfare loss would be 1.9% of GDP (PESETA III).  
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The burden of climate change shows a clear north-south divide, with southern regions in Europe impacted 
more   
The south of Europe is expected to suffer relatively more than other parts of Europe with increasing levels 
of global warming, in large because of consequent changes in high-end temperatures and the spatial and 
temporal availability of water.     
 The frequency of heatwaves rises more dramatically in the south of Europe. With unmitigated climate 
change, human exposure to severe heatwaves would be multiplied around 30 times at higher latitudes, 
while it could be 40 to 50 times more in countries in southern Europe (e.g., Spain and Greece).     
 During summer, water availability would nearly drop to half in southern European regions that already 
face the highest water stress. Water resources in northern Europe would increase. 
 Electricity production by hydropower would increase in the north, while hydro and nuclear power would 
reduce in southern Europe due to lower water availability for direct production and river cooling. 
 Without market adjustments, wheat and maize yield would drop by more than 10% on average in 
southern Europe. In northern Europe wheat (maize) yield would increase (decrease) by around 5%.      
 With high warming nearly half of total EU and UK drought losses would occur in Mediterranean EU 
countries, compared to 40% at present.  
 In southern mountain ranges the rate of upward tree line shift is double than that at high latitudes, and 
the alpine tundra would almost completely vanish with high warming.  
 The rise in fire danger and exposure to it of people near wildland is stronger at lower latitudes.  
 Welfare losses from the climate impacts monetised in PESETA IV show a clear north-south divide, with 
welfare losses in southern regions that would be several times larger compared to those in the north of 
Europe.  
 
 
Climate mitigation can considerably lower the impacts of climate change in the EU   
All climate impacts considered in PESETA IV would be reduced significantly with mitigation polices attaining 
the Paris Agreement targets: 
 More than half of the alpine tundra would remain stable, compared to only 16% without mitigation. 
Vertical tree lines shifts would be reduced by more than 50%.  
 The intensity of change in the prevailing ecological domains in southern Europe and Boreal areas and 
the encroachment of the Tropical domain in Europe would be limited.  
 The increase in the number of people near wildland that are annually exposed to at least 10 days of 
high-to-extreme fire danger would be limited to 5 million, compared to 15 million with 3°C global 
warming.   
 The number of people annually exposed to deadly heatwaves would be reduced by 200 million with 
60,000 fewer deaths per year.  
 The drop in water resources availability in southern regions would be halved. The number of people living 
in areas with severe water stress would remain stable, compared to a fourfold multiplication with high 
warming.  
 Annual drought losses would be reduced by 20 €billion/year.   
 Each year around 230,000 fewer people would be exposed to river flooding and river flood damage 
would be halved to 24 €billion/year with 1.5°C in 2100, compared to a 3°C scenario. 
 Coastal flood losses would be lowered by more than 100 €billion/year in 2100.  
 Welfare losses could be reduced by 75% compared to unmitigated climate change.   
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Climate change adaptation can reduce unavoidable impacts of climate change in the EU in a cost-efficient 
way  
Even if global warming were limited to well below 2oC there will be unavoidable impacts in the EU. PESETA 
IV exemplifies, through pan-European assessments of the costs and benefits of risk reduction measures for 
river and coastal flooding, that adaptation can reduce climate change impacts in a cost-efficient way.  
The analyses show that the benefits of adaption measures are long lasting and avoided climate change 
damage grows in time and with increasing global warming. In case of unmitigated climate change, 
 reducing flood peaks by installing retention reservoirs would reduce annual river flood damage at the 
end of the century by nearly 40 €billion and around 400,000 fewer people would be exposed each year 
to flooding in the EU and the UK. The annual investment from now until 2100 to install and maintain 
the reservoirs would be 3.3 €billion/year. There are additional benefits of nature-based storage areas, 
such as restoring the natural functioning of floodplain areas and improving ecosystem quality.  
 strengthening protection along coastlines of populated and economically pivotal coastal areas would 
avoid 220 €billion of coastal flood losses each year in the EU and UK at the end of this century, for an 
annual cost of less than 2 €billion/year from now until 2100. Also 1.4 million fewer people would be 
exposed each year to coastal flooding. The effects of global warming on sea level rise will continue long 
after stabilising the climate, hence so will the benefits of coastal adaptation. An unavoidable drawback 
of the strong rise in sea levels and consequent need for adaptation is that in about 25% of the coastline 
of the EU the sea would be disconnected from the hinterland by natural or physical barriers, which in 
some regions can be up to two metres high.   
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Main findings for different impact categories 
 
Human mortality from heat and cold waves 
Global warming will result in a strong net increase in exposure to and fatalities from temperature extremes, 
assuming there is no adaptation. Regarding heatwaves, with 1.5°C around 100 million Europeans would be 
exposed each year to an intense heatwave (corresponding to a present 50-year or more extreme heatwave 
event), or tenfold compared to now. This further grows to 170 million/year with 2°C and nearly 300 million/year, 
or more than half of the EU and UK population, with 3°C global warming. The rise in exposure to extreme heat 
is most severe in southern Europe.  
Assuming present vulnerability and no additional adaptation, annual fatalities from extreme heat could rise 
from 2,700 deaths/year now to approximately 30,000 and 50,000 by 2050 with 1.5°C and 2°C global warming, 
respectively. With 3°C in 2100, each year 90,000 Europeans could die from extreme heat. The rise in fatalities 
from extreme heat is more acute in southern European countries, with the highest number of fatalities occurring 
in France, Italy and Spain. 
With respect to cold waves, milder winters will reduce significantly exposure to and fatalities from extreme cold, 
which are already a fraction of the deaths from extreme heat.  
These projections do not account for the fact that the European population is ageing. The number of people 
above 65 years in the EU and UK will grow from 100 million now to 150 million by 2050, which could negatively 
affect human mortality from temperature extremes. Further, increasing urbanisation could amplify the urban 
heat island effect, which causes urban and metropolitan areas to be significantly warmer than their surrounding 
rural areas.  
 
Windstorms  
Windstorms are amongst the most damaging natural hazards in Europe, with approximately 5 €billion of 
estimated annual losses in the EU and UK. Climate model projections suggest that windstorms will not become 
more intense or happen more frequently with global warming over most of the European land.  
With 3°C warming, maximum wind speeds will likely reduce over 16% of the land area, increase over nearly 
10% and remain relatively stable over the rest of Europe. Southern Europe is the region with the largest share 
of the area with an increase in wind extremes (17%), while central-western Europe has the largest share of 
land for which less intense wind extremes are projected (24%). Furthermore, the number of windy or stormy 
days does not show significant changes, while there is a robust tendency projected towards more calm days 
over most of Europe.  
Current models project that windstorm losses will not grow due to climate change. Future economic damage 
from windstorms will increase due to the size of the economy and consequent higher values of the exposed 
assets and construction costs. Windstorm annual losses are projected to grow to nearly 7 €billion/year in 2050 
and to 11 €billion/year by the end of this century.  
 
Water resources  
Global warming will result in a general wetting of the north of Europe and a drying of the south. This results in 
increasing water availability in the north and a reduction in the south. The duration and intensity of water 
scarcity will grow in already existing water scarce areas in southern Europe. At higher levels of warming, water 
availability, especially in summer, will also drop in western parts of Europe and at higher latitudes. As a result, 
new areas that face periods of water scarcity will emerge in countries like Bulgaria, Romania France, Belgium, 
the Netherlands, Germany, Denmark, and the UK. 
The number of people who are living in areas that are considered to be water scarce for at least one month 
every year could rise from 52 million nowadays to 65 million in a 3°C warming scenario, which is equivalent to 
15% of the current EU and UK population. The number of people living in severe water stress, now around 3.3 
million, would become fourfold with unmitigated climate. In parts of southern Europe, during summer months 
practically all available water will be used, and the majority of people and economic activities in these regions 
would face water scarcity.  
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Droughts  
With global warming, droughts will happen more frequently, last longer and become more intense in southern 
and western regions of Europe, while drought conditions will become less extreme in northern and northeastern 
parts of Europe. The Mediterranean region is projected to have the largest relative area affected by an increase 
in drought with global warming: the frequency of droughts increases across two-thirds of the region in a 1.5°C 
warming scenario. This rises to more than 80% of the region with 3°C warming, with 23% of the region 
experiencing a doubling in the frequency of droughts compared to nowadays. Also across 15% of the Atlantic 
region droughts will happen twice as often with unmitigated climate change. 
With 3°C global warming in 2100 total losses from drought in Europe would grow from 9 €billion/year now to 
45 €billion/year. Under the mitigation scenarios the rise in damage in 2100 would be approximately halved 
compared to no mitigation. The Mediterranean and Atlantic regions see the largest rise in drought losses from 
global warming. Their share in the total EU and UK drought losses progressively increases with warming and 
would grow to 86% with 3°C warming. Part of the projected rise in future economic losses from droughts is due 
to the growth of the economy. Yet, changes in the economy also dampen future losses when compared to the 
size of the economy because drought-sensitive sectors, and especially agriculture, are projected to become less 
economically prevalent in future EU economies.  
 
River floods  
Global warming and continued development in flood prone areas will progressively increase river flood risk. 
With 3°C global warming by the end of the century, river flood damage in the EU and UK would be six times 
present losses of 7.8 €billion/year and nearly half a million people would be exposed to river flooding each year, 
compared to 170,000 now. Keeping global warming with 1.5°C would halve these economic impacts and reduce 
the number of people exposed by 230,000.  
Adequate adaptation strategies can further substantially reduce future flood impacts. Four adaptation options 
have been explored at pan-European scale: reducing flood peaks using retention areas, strengthening existing 
dyke systems, implementing building-based damage reduction measures, and relocation.  
Reducing flood peaks using retention areas shows the strongest potential to lower direct impacts in a cost-
efficient way. Implementing the optimal design for the 3°C warming scenario would require for the EU and UK 
an average annual investment of 3.3 €billion/year over the period 2020-2100 (undiscounted values), which 
would lower economic damage from flooding by 40 €billion/year (82% reduction) at the end of the century. 
Additional benefits include the restoration of the natural functioning of floodplain areas and hereby improving 
ecosystem quality. Strengthening existing dyke systems can also prevent floods from happening (reducing the 
expected damage with 68% for the 3°C warming), yet they can transfer risk downstream and stimulate further 
development behind the flood barriers. Implementing building-based damage reduction measures do not avoid 
floods, but they can reduce EU expected damage by 50% for the 3°C warming scenario, and this in a very cost-
efficient manner because they require limited implementation investments. Relocation is less cost-efficient and 
subject to large variability in the implementation costs, and has lower social acceptance. 
 
Coastal floods 
Extreme sea levels in Europe could rise by as much as one metre or more by the end of this century due to 
global warming. Consequent damage from coastal flooding will rise sharply for all EU countries with a coastline 
if current levels of coastal protection are not raised. Without mitigation, annual economic damage in the EU 
and UK would grow to 239 €billion by 2100 and the population exposed to coastal flooding would reach 2.2 
million. With moderate mitigation the damage would be reduced by half (to €111 billion/year) and the exposed 
population would be 1.4 million/year, still significantly greater than at present (1.4 €billion/year of damage and 
0.1 million people annually population). 
The potential of raising dykes to reduce coastal impacts has been assessed as an adaptation option, likely an 
unavoidable strategy along developed stretches of Europe’s coastlines given the pronounced projected rises in 
sea level extremes. Raising dykes would reduce damage and the population affected by around 90% and 60% 
in 2100, respectively. The average annual cost of adaptation over the period 2020-2100 would be less than 2 
€billion/year for the EU and UK, which is about two orders lower than the avoided coastal flood losses by the 
end of the century. This means that investing now in coastal protection will have very large (and growing) 
benefits in the long term.  
 9 
The protected areas would be the urbanised and economically important areas, and cover about one fifth of 
the European coastline. The average raise in protection over these stretches is around one metre, but in some 
places more than two metres. This implies that along many densely populated and economically pivotal coastal 
stretches of the EU the shoreline may become disconnected from hinterland areas.   
 
Wildfires 
The probability of high-to-extreme wildfire danger is projected to rise nearly everywhere in Europe as a result 
of changing weather conditions associated with global warming. The projected increase in fire danger intensity 
and number of days with high-fire potential amplifies with the level of warming, and is strongest in southern 
European countries, where fires already occur more often and are more intense. Yet, recent events in Sweden, 
Ireland and the UK show that fires are not limited to southern Europe.  
The number of people in Europe that live near wildland and that are exposed to high-to-extreme levels of fire 
danger for at least 10 days per year would grow by 15 million (+24%) with 3°C global warming, compared to 
now. When limiting global warming to 1.5°C, this would be 10 million fewer people.  
Climate change would also result in major shifts northwards of ecological domains. Especially southern Europe 
and Boreal areas would experience severe changes in the prevailing ecological domain components. Higher 
levels of warming also increase the likelihood that the Tropical domain would encroach in Europe.  The profound 
transformation of bioclimatic conditions will outpace the time required for vegetation to adapt to it and pose a 
main stress on the structure and composition of wildland vegetation (forests, shrub and grassland). This will 
increase the vulnerability to fires, but also affect vegetation recovery after the fire.  
Stringent mitigation would limit the contractions and expansions. Yet, mitigation alone is not enough to avoid 
adverse climate change impacts and adaptation strategies will be needed in order to enhance social–ecological 
resilience to wildfires. 
 
Alpine tundra habitat loss 
The alpine tundra domain occurs at the top of high mountains in Europe and about 98% of its domain is in the 
Pyrenees, Alps and Scandes. The domain is rich in biodiversity and provides key ecosystem services. Due to the 
tight ecological-climatic bands in mountains, climate change could have major effects on alpine ecosystems. In 
a 3°C warming scenario, the alpine tundra domain over Europe would shrink by 84% of its present size, including 
the loss of precious Natura 2000 sites. In the Pyrenees high warming could lead to a near disappearance of the 
alpine tundra, while in the Alps and Scandes it would shrink by around 75% and 87% respectively of its present 
size. Limiting warming to 1.5°C would restrict alpine tundra contraction to 48%, most strongly in the Alps where 
the domain contraction would be limited to a loss of 36%.  
The natural climatic treeline is projected to move vertically upwards by up to 8 metres every year with 
unmitigated climate change. The rate of treeline shift is generally faster at lower latitudes, where climatic 
treelines are already higher. In the southernmost mountain regions the treeline moves upwards by around 6-7 
m every year in the 1.5°C warming scenario, compared to 2-3 m/year at high latitudes. In a 3°C warming 
scenario, the treeline in the Pyrenees could rise by 642 m, in the Alps by 526 m and in the Scandes by 336 m. 
The projected changes have implications for vital ecosystem services, habitat for biodiversity, and recreational 
services such as skiing. Adaptation is challenging because of the unique topographic, soil and climatic 
characteristics of high mountain systems. 
 
Forest ecosystems 
In recent years, about 14 billion tonnes of forest biomass in the EU and UK, or two third of the total biomass, 
was found to be potentially vulnerable to natural disturbances. Nearly half of that amount (46%) is threatened 
by windstorms, followed by forest fires (29%) and insect outbreaks (25%). Hotspot regions with high forest 
susceptibility to windstorms, fires and insect outbreaks are located in both southern and northern Europe. This 
spatial pattern is strongly controlled by the interplay of forest characteristics with the background climate.  
Over the last two decades, an increasing amount of forests in Europe has become vulnerable to insect 
outbreaks, particularly in high-latitude regions. The combination of rising temperature and changes in 
precipitation in the last two decades has likely reduced plant defence mechanisms and increased their 
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vulnerability to insect outbreaks. No clear trends can be detected in the forest vulnerability to windstorms and 
fires over this period.  
Global warming is likely to increase natural disturbances in the future, especially those from fires and insect 
outbreaks that are more sensitive to climate. As a result, key forest ecosystem services - such as carbon 
sequestration, erosion control, water regulation or wood supply - could be seriously affected in the near future.  
 
Agriculture 
Climate change is expected to lower grain maize potential yield by -11% and -5% on average in southern and 
northern Europe respectively under a 2°C warming scenario. In the absence of irrigation, declines in yield of 
over 20% are projected for all EU countries, with crop losses up to 80% in some southern European countries 
(Portugal, Bulgaria, Greece and Spain). This implies that grain maize production may no longer be viable in areas 
where irrigation is restricted due to water scarcity and precipitation significantly decreases. Even adaptation 
strategies, such as changing sowing dates and the sown variety, would not suffice to offset the projected strong 
reduction in rain-fed grain maize yield.  
The production of wheat, which is mostly a rain-fed crop in Europe, would increase by 5% on average in northern 
Europe because of changing precipitation regimes, an anticipated growing cycle and enhanced CO2 fertilization. 
In southern regions of Europe, however, yield reductions of 12% are estimated (in some areas yields could be 
halved) due to the strong decrease in precipitation. However, changing varieties could have a large beneficial 
effect for rain-fed wheat production. 
The negative effects of climate change on crop yields in Europe projected by biophysical models may 
considerably be reduced by changes induced by market adjustments, given the severe climate change impacts 
on large agricultural producers outside Europe. Therefore, EU production could slightly increase because Europe 
is projected to have a comparative advantage versus other world production regions with larger negative effects 
in terms of climate change impacts on agricultural productivity.  
 
Energy production 
The effects of climate change on different power sources vary throughout Europe and depends on the future 
energy mix. In northern Europe, where there is already high capacity for hydropower, the increase in water 
resources availability with global warming could lead to more hydropower production. Since hydropower has a 
lower marginal cost compared to thermal sources, the demand for power from thermal sources like biomass, 
coal, gas and oil would reduce in these regions. Depending on the local electricity production mix, the substitution 
effect is different, e.g. mainly biomass in Sweden, coal in Finland, oil in Lithuania and gas in Latvia. This would 
lead to economic benefits in northern Europe of around 1.3 €billion/year (2015 values) with 3°C warming. 
In southern regions water resources are expected to become scarcer with increasing levels of global warming. 
This would result in a reduction in hydropower and nuclear production. The substitution by non-nuclear thermal 
plants that have higher marginal production costs could lead to an increase in production costs by around 0.9 
€billion/year (2015 values) with 3°C warming. 
The direct impacts of climate change on wind and solar production are not significant. However, in the 2050 
power system that is in line with a 2°C mitigation scenario wind and solar capacity would increase in southern 
regions to compensate for the lost hydropower and nuclear power production. 
 
Economic integration 
Seven climate impact categories have been assessed in broader economic terms, assuming that future climate 
would happen today (comparative static setting assuming today’s economic structure and size): river floods, 
coastal floods, agriculture, energy supply, droughts, windstorms and human mortality. The economic 
assessment does not evaluate the full economic impacts of climate change because of the limited coverage of 
climate impacts. 
Exposing present economy to global warming of 3°C would result in an annual welfare loss of 175 €billion 
(1.38% of GDP). Under a 2°C scenario the welfare loss would be 83 €billion/year (0.65% of GDP), while 
restricting warming to 1.5°C would reduce welfare loss to 42 €billion/year (0.33% of GDP). PESETA III estimated 
 11 
a welfare loss of 1.9% of GDP for a 4°C warming scenario, indicating that economic impacts further grow with 
the intensity of global warming. 
Human mortality from extreme heat dominates the economic climate impacts, but its contribution is strongly 
dependent on the monetary valuation of human life. The magnitude of welfare losses in southern regions of 
Europe is estimated to be several times larger compared to that in the north. Welfare losses related to the 
impact categories considered would be substantially reduced when reaching the Paris Agreement global 
warming targets. In particular, limiting warming to 2°C would halve economic impacts compared to a 3°C 
scenario, while achieving the stringent Paris target of 1.5°C would lower welfare loss by 75%. 
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1 Introduction 
Climate change is among the biggest threats for humanity, seriously affecting human health1, the natural 
environment2, and security3. Despite the ambition of the Paris Agreement4 on Climate Change to keep global 
warming ‘well below 2°C’ compared to pre-industrial temperatures and to pursue a more ambitious goal of 
1.5°C, greenhouse gas emissions worldwide are still growing. As global temperature is now around 1˚C higher 
compared to the late 19th century, the likelihood that global warming will surpass the Paris targets is growing. 
If adequate mitigation strategies are not introduced global warming could reach 3°C or more by 2100. 
The EU is preparing to minimise future impacts of unavoidable climate change in its member states through 
the EU Adaptation Strategy. A key objective of the strategy is to promote better informed decision-making by 
refining knowledge gaps (identifying and addressing them) and enhance knowledge sharing and transfer across 
Europe. Action 4 of the Strategy, in particular, aims to bridge the knowledge gap for some key unknowns. These 
include 'information on damage from climate change’ and the ‘benefits and costs of adaptation'. Climate 
impacts in Europe are not yet fully understood and quantified, especially with regard to extremes or impacts on 
ecosystems and security. Moreover, there is a clear need for a better understanding of how climate impacts 
could be reduced with sectoral adaptation measures and at what economic cost. Many of these issues remain 
challenging research topics, especially the quantification of the vulnerability of people, economic sectors and 
ecosystems to climate change and the economic analysis of adaptation. 
The series of PESETA (Projection of Economic impacts of climate change in Sectors of the European Union based 
on bottom-up Analysis) projects of the Joint Research Centre (JRC) of the European Commission aim to reduce 
the knowledge gap on climate change impacts and adaptation. Together, they represent a continuous effort to 
integrate cumulated and new JRC research to better understand some of the key potential consequences of 
future climate change in the EU, both in biophysical and economic terms, and the costs and benefits of 
adaptation. This is relevant for the ongoing development and implementation of European climate policy on 
mitigation and adaptation.  
This report summarises the main outcomes of the JRC PESETA IV project. The project integrates a common set 
of climate scenarios and socioeconomic data with detailed biophysical process simulation and economic 
modelling. Impacts are estimated for the warming targets set out in the Paris Agreement (1.5°C and 2°C) as 
well as a higher level of warming (3°C), which is closer to what could be expected by the end of the twenty-first 
century without adequate mitigation. The assessment looks at effects on people, economic sectors and the 
environment based on bottom-up impact analyses for agriculture, energy, river flooding, coastal floods, drought, 
habitat loss, forest fires, water, human impacts of heat and cold waves, forest ecosystems, and windstorms.  
The JRC PESETA IV project improves and widens the overall assessment along its three main dimensions, 
compared to JRC PESETA III. Firstly, a larger ensemble of climate scenarios is used to better account for 
uncertainties in both greenhouse gas emissions and in the climate models that translate these emissions into 
climate projections. Secondly, new impact categories are included in the impact modelling: mortality from 
extreme heat and cold, economic losses and fatalities from windstorms, economic losses from drought and 
impacts on forest ecosystems. Thirdly, the river and coastal flood analyses explicitly model adaptation following 
a cost-benefit approach, while agriculture also considers adaptation to some extent. For the other impact areas 
possible adaptation options are discussed. 
The study includes as many climate change impacts as feasible at present, but is not comprehensive in terms 
of the broad range of potential consequences of climate change. The project performed assessments of impacts 
for several climate extremes (heat and cold waves, drought, windstorms, river and coastal flooding), yet some 
sector impact analysis not do fully capture the consequences of changes in such extremes. Hence, the 
biophysical and economic impacts quantified serve as a lower bound of the potential impacts of climate change 
in the EU. Estimates reported here are inherently uncertain and should not be interpreted as forecasts or 
definitive predictions of future impacts for a particular place, region or country. Rather, they aim to provide 
insights regarding the general patterns of climate change impacts across the EU and the potential benefits of 
climate policy actions. 
                                           
1 https://www.who.int/globalchange/global-campaign/cop21/en/  
2 https://www.ipbes.net/global-assessment-report-biodiversity-ecosystem-services  
3 https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2019/02/10/climate-change-still-seen-as-the-top-global-threat-but-cyberattacks-a-rising-concern/  
4 Adoption of the Paris Agreement FCCC/CP/2015/L.9 (UNFCC, 2015) 
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The audience of this report is the policymakers’ community, therefore it is intended to be concise with a non-
technical language. The report does not enter into the technical aspects of the climate impact and adaptation 
assessment, which can be found in the related JRC technical reports listed below.  
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2 Methodology 
2.1 Project implementation 
Figure 1 gives an overview of the project, which involves three main stages. In the first stage, a common set of 
climate change and socioeconomic data are prepared to feed the biophysical and economic impact modelling. 
In the second stage, separate biophysical models are run in order to quantify how the projected changes in 
climate variables affects agricultural crop yields, energy supply, river floods, coastal floods, heat and cold 
waves, drought, habitat suitability, forest fires, forest ecosystems, water resources and windstorms. In stage 
three, a subset of the biophysical impacts are analysed in terms of direct human impacts and economic losses; 
in particular, for agriculture, energy supply, river floods, coastal floods, heat and cold waves, drought and 
windstorms. Finally, the direct human and economic impacts are integrated into an overall economic model in 
order to estimate corresponding welfare losses.  
 
 
  
Figure 1. Overview of the project methodology 
 
2.2 Scenario design 
The level of global warming depends on the concentration of greenhouse gasses (GHG) in the atmosphere. 
Future emissions are determined by human activities and socioeconomic development. In order to account for 
uncertainty in future emissions a range of plausible pathways of GHG concentrations are considered in the 
scientific community to visualise alternative futures. These Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs) 
describe different levels of greenhouse gas concentrations and radiative forcing that might occur in the future 
(Van Vuuren et al., 2011).   
The project evaluates the effects of GHG mitigation by estimating climate impacts for the Paris targets (1.5°C 
and 2°C) and a higher warming level (3°C). It considers a common set of climate projections under a moderate 
mitigation (RCP4.5) and high emissions (RCP8.5) pathway in order to evaluate impacts both for low and high 
levels of global warming. 
The project assesses socioeconomic impacts of global warming within a specific setting of the state of the 
economy. That can be the economy as of today (static approach) or the economy of the future (dynamic 
approach). The static approach portrays how global warming and climate change would impact today’s 
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population and economy. This approach is appropriate in order to avoid making assumptions on the future (long-
term) evolution of the socioeconomic systems (demography, economy size, sectoral decomposition of the GDP, 
etc.), which are highly uncertain and could greatly distort the sectoral impacts of climate change. An additional 
advantage of this methodology is that it aids the comparison of the severity of the different impacts against 
the same economic system metrics. However, the absolute damage figures may be unrealistic (and highly 
conservative), as they do not consider the long-term dynamic growth of the overall economies. 
The dynamic socioeconomic assessment evaluates how climate at the different global warming levels would 
impact EU society as projected for 2050 and 2100 according the ECFIN Ageing Report projections of population 
and economy (European Commission, 2014; Havik et al., 2014). As a 3°C warming scenario is unlikely to occur 
by mid-century, only the Paris targets are considered in 2050, while in 2100 the three warming levels are 
considered. Comparison of the static and dynamic economic analyses allows the effects of climate and 
socioeconomic changes on future climate risk to be disentangled. The dynamic assessment has been 
implemented in all impact assessments that quantify damage in monetary terms, while the assessment of the 
overall effect on the economy is based on a static general equilibrium model for today’s economy.  
 
2.3 Projections of future climate 
The climate models used in PESETA simulate physical climate processes on a grid that covers the whole of 
Europe. The climate models used are known as regional climate models (RCMs), which mean that they produce 
climate projections at a relatively fine scale. Climate simulations differ between climate models, even when the 
forces that drive the climate, such as greenhouse gas emissions, are the same, and when all models are built 
in plausible ways. This is known as climate modelling uncertainty. To account for this uncertainty, the project 
uses an ensemble of 11 climate models that took part in a large, on-going climate model inter-comparison 
project called Coordinated Regional-climate Downscaling Experiment over Europe (EURO-CORDEX1).  
Simulations of the past climate from climate models can differ from the actual measured climate. Climate 
model simulations are therefore often corrected to account for such biases, through a statistical procedure 
known as “bias correction”. All of the climate model simulations used in PESETA were bias corrected using an 
established method that has been extensively used in other studies.  
The project implements the “time sampling” approach to select climate conditions at the global warming levels 
under the two transient pathways considered (RCP4.5 and RCP8.5). This assumes that the impacts at a certain 
warming level can be derived from the transient climate projections by considering climate and corresponding 
impacts over a 30-year time window centred on the year when the targeted global warming level is reached. It 
is thus possible to decouple impacts from the time at which a specific global warming level is reached, and to 
look at how different warming levels affect future societies at different points in time. For most climate 
variables and impacts the effect of the pathway to reach a global warming level is small over Europe compared 
to the climate model variability (Maule et al., 2017).  
For time-variant changes such as sea level rise, which will continue long after climate has stabilised at a certain 
global warming level, the time dimension however remains critical. Therefore, results of the coastal impact 
analysis with a dynamic economic setting are presented for 2050 and 2100 rather than for the global warming 
levels. 
 
2.4 Socioeconomic projections 
The dynamic socioeconomic scenario considered is that of the ECFIN Ageing Report (European Commission, 
2014; Havik et al., 2014). The EU Ageing Report projections are based on very detailed analyses of the 
determinants of long-term growth in Europe, notably demographics, labour market and planned legislation 
measures and furthermore, they have been assessed by the EU member states economic departments and 
other related ministries. As the Ageing Report refers to the period to 2060, the projections have been extended 
to the year 2100 based on plausible assumptions. The rules of factor accumulation regarding total factor 
productivity (TFP) and capital are the same as those in the Ageing Report (the contribution of TFP and capital 
for the 2060-2100 period are the same as for the 2055-2060 period). The labour force projections are the 
                                           
1 http://www.cordex.org/  
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same as those of the overall population growth, which come from the United Nations (UN) medium variant case 
(UN, 2015). 
The project uses the 2015 Ageing Report projections that were available at the time of the project 
implementation. For the EU as a whole, there are no major differences compared to the more recent 2018 
Ageing Report projections: EU GDP growth is slightly lower in the 2018 Aging Report over the period 2025-
2050, while it is marginally higher during 2055-2070. For some Member States, however, there are substantial 
variations, with lower average annual GDP growth rates in the 2018 Ageing Report for Cyprus, Italy, Greece and 
Portugal (e.g. Italy -1.3 percentage points difference in 2020-2035), and the largest upward variations for 
Malta, Latvia, Slovakia and Romania (e.g. Malta +1.8 percentage points in 2020-2025). 
 
2.5 Overview of impact models 
Table 1 presents an overview of the modelling approaches used in PESETA IV. The project uses a combination 
of process-based and empirical models. Process-based approaches simulate physical or biological processes 
that explicitly describe system behaviour in response to climate change. Empirical approaches seek correlative 
relationships among the data in line with mechanistic understanding, but without necessarily fully describing 
system behaviour and interactions. Generally, process-based models include some empirical information and 
the correlative relationships of empirical models assume a link to processes. So in practice many models use a 
hybrid approach, combining a process-based and empirical representation of relationships (Adams et al., 2013). 
More details on the models used can be found in the references listed in Table 1 and in the separate reports in 
which the PESETA impact analyses are described (see reference added to each short description below).    
Heat and cold waves 
The Heat and Cold Wave Magnitude Index are derived from the bias-corrected climate projections and take into 
account the duration and intensity of the hot and cold spells. Extreme value analysis is applied to these indices 
in order to understand how the intensity and frequency of such extremes could change with global warming. 
Human exposure is appraised by combining modelled heat and cold extremes with high resolution population 
density maps. Human mortality rates from heat and cold extremes are derived from reported fatalities in 
disaster records and simulated population exposure. These are then applied to the projections of heat and cold 
waves, assuming no changes in human vulnerability. More details in Naumann et al. (2020).   
Windstorms 
Daily maximum wind velocity simulated by the climate models is used as an indicator of windstorms. Extreme 
value analysis is applied to this index in order to understand how often and with what intensity wind extremes 
could happen under different levels of global warming. Exposure of the construction stock and population to 
windstorms is appraised by combining modelled wind extremes with high resolution land use and population 
density maps. Damage functions and mortality rates are derived from reported economic windstorm losses and 
fatalities in disaster records and simulated construction stock and population exposure. The damage function 
and mortality rates are then applied to the projections of windstorms, assuming no changes in vulnerability. 
Projections of daily wind speed are also used in the analysis on wind energy supply (average wind speed) and 
forest disturbances (extreme wind speed). More details in Spinoni et al. (2020).   
Water resources 
A hydrological model is used to simulate the spatial and temporal distribution of water on, above and below 
the earth surface across Europe. It takes into account spatial variataions in land use, soil properties and 
vegetation characteristics and uses as input simulated climate variables such as precipitation, temperature, 
wind, radiation and humidity. The model also includes water extraction by different sectors, including agriculture 
(irrigation and live stock), energy, public water and industrial water use. Irrigation water demand is estimated 
dynamically within the model, while the other uses are estimated based on national water statistics. Water 
scarcity is estimated based on the net water consumption versus available renewable water resources of a 
region. Exposure of economic activity and population to water shortage is evaluated by intersecting simulated 
water scarcity with regional statistics on production output of sectors and high resolution population density 
maps. Projections of river flows by the hydrological model are also used in the analysis on drought (low river 
flows), floods (high river flows), and energy supply (average river flows for hydropower and cooling of power 
production). More details in Bisselink et al. (2020). 
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Table 1. Overview of impact modelling in PESETA IV 
Impact category Biophysical modelling Socioeconomic impact modelling 
Heat and cold 
waves 
Heat and cold wave magnitude index 
modelling (Russo et al., 2015); extreme 
value analysis (Mentaschi et al., 2016) 
Human exposure and empirical 
mortality rates (Forzieri et al., 2017) 
Windstorms 
Windstorm indicator modelling (Outten et 
al., 2013); extreme value analysis 
(Mentaschi et al., 2016). 
Empirical wind damage function 
(Spinoni et al., 2019) and human 
mortality rates (Forzieri et al., 2017) 
Water resources 
Hydrological and water use modelling with 
LISFLOOD (Van der Knijff et al., 2010); 
water scarcity analysis (Bisselink et al., 
2018).  
Human exposure to water scarcity 
(Bisselink et al., 2020). 
Drought 
Hydrological and water use modelling with 
LISFLOOD; extreme low flow analysis 
(Forzieri et al., 2014). 
Empirical drought loss functions 
(Cammalleri et al., 2020). 
River flooding 
Hydrological and water use modelling with 
LISFLOOD; extreme high flow analysis; flood 
inundation modelling (Alfieri et al., 2015a). 
Empirical water depth-damage 
functions (Alfieri et al., 2015b). 
Coastal flooding 
Sea level rise projections; surge, wave and 
tide modelling, flood inundation modelling 
(Vousdoukas et al., 2017).  
Empirical water depth – damage 
functions (Vousdoukas et al., 2018).  
Wildfires 
Numerical simulation weather-driven fire 
danger using Canadian Fire Weather Index 
(FWI) system (de Rigo et al., 2017); 
Estimation of wildland-urban interface 
(Costa et al., 2020). Modelling shifts in 
ecological domains (de Rigo et al., 2016).  
 
Habitat loss 
Köppen-Geiger climate classification of 
alpine tundra (Kottek et al., 2006); mapping 
of treeline position (Körner and Paulsen, 
2004).   
 
Forest ecosystems 
Empirical vulnerability analysis of European 
forests to fires, windstorms and insect 
outbreaks (Forzieri et al., 2020) 
 
Agriculture 
Crop yield modelling with World Food 
Studies Simulation Model (WOFOST) model 
(Blanco et al., 2017; de Wit et al., 2019). 
Agriculture economic modelling with 
the Common Agricultural Policy 
Regionalised Impact (CAPRI) model 
(Britz and Witzke, 2014) 
Energy supply 
Energy supply modelling with POLES energy 
model (Després et al., 2018). 
Modelling of energy production costs 
(Després et al., 2018). 
Economic 
integration 
 
Integrated economic modelling with 
Climate assessment General 
Equilibrium (CaGE) model (Pycroft et 
al., 2016; Ciscar et al., 2011).  
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Drought 
The low flow spectrum of the river flow simulations are analysed to estimate streamflow drought, which reflects 
the spatially integrated negative anomaly in water resources over river basins. Extreme value analysis is applied 
to annual minimum river flows to project how frequently and with what intensity drought could occur in view 
of global warming. The vulnerability to drought is quantified based on reported economic losses from drought 
disaster records and the simulated drought intensity for these events. The impacts are further disaggregated 
over drought sensitive sectors based on expert and literature information on drought sensitivity of different 
sectors and statistics on the economic value of these sectors. The derived statistical relationship between 
drought intensity and damage in drought-sensitive sectors, which in the analysis is assumed to be static, is then 
applied to the projected drought conditions with warming in order to quantify the corresponding drought risk. 
More details in Cammalleri et al. (2020).     
River flooding 
High river flows of the hydrological simulations are used to estimate the probability of occurrence and intensity 
of river floods. When river water levels exceed current flood protection standards the corresponding inundated 
areas and flood depth are estimated. This information is then combined with high resolution population and 
land use maps in order to quantify people and assets exposed to river flooding. With country-specific statistical 
relations between flood water depth and damage for different land use types the direct economic loss is 
calculated for each flood event. The analysis then evaluates the cost and benefits of the following adaptation 
options: strengthening of existing dyke systems, implementing flood damage reduction measures for buildings, 
building of retention areas to store flood waters, and relocation of people and buildings from flood-prone to 
flood-safe areas. The evaluation of each adaptation strategy is performed using a cost-benefit analysis that 
optimises the overall costs of implementation and avoided economic flood damage over the life time of the 
measure. More details in Dottori et al. (2020).      
Coastal flooding 
Extreme levels along Europe’s coastlines are estimated based on state-of-the-art projections of sea level rise 
and the modelling of waves, storm surges and tides using simulated climate variables such as wind speed and 
pressure. When extreme sea levels overtop present coastal protection the corresponding flood inundation extent 
and depth are estimated. Similar as for river flooding, this information is then combined with high resolution 
population and land use maps in order to quantify people and assets exposed to coastal flooding. With country-
specific statistical relations between coastal flood water depth and damage for different land use types the 
direct economic loss is calculated for each flood event. The analysis then evaluates the cost and benefits of 
increasing coastal protection through dyke improvements along the European coastline, assuming that in 
densely populated and highly developed coastal communities the preferred option is to ‘hold the line’ of existing 
dyke systems. The evaluation of the optimal design level is performed using a cost-benefit analysis that 
optimises the overall costs of implementation and avoided economic flood damage over the life time of the 
measure. More details in Vousdoukas et al. (2020).      
Wildfires 
Weather-driven fire danger is estimated numerically on a daily basis. The model combines temperature, wind 
speed, relative humidity, and precipitation projected by the climate models and also accounts for the cumulative 
dynamic effects of the weather in the previous days. Daily fire danger is classified considering six classes of 
fire danger from days with low danger up to days with extreme danger and the probability of occurrence 
(average number of days in a year) of the different classes of fire danger is calculated. Potential changes in 
ecological domain and local ecological patterns with global warming, which are an indication of future 
vegetation vulnerability to fire, is assessed based on the projected changes in temperature. The vulnerable 
interface between wildland and human presence is assessed at high-resolution by combining land use 
information and population density maps. More details in Costa et al. (2020).  
Habitat loss 
Alpine tundra is mapped using a climate classification equivalent to polar climates, where the mean temperature 
of the warmest month is less than 10°C. The projections of temperature by the climate models is corrected for 
bias and downscaled to high resolution accounting for altitude effects. Projected changes in the alpine tundra 
domain are then classified in three potential categories: stable, contraction and expansion. The climatic treeline 
position is located using a growing season canopy temperature threshold of 7.6°C. Treeline shifts with global 
warming are assessed in 16 mountain regions in Europe, from the Mediterranean islands to the Boreal areas 
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and from the Iberian Peninsula to the Carpathians, including the more prominent treeline ecotones of Europe. 
Natura 2000 sites projected to be affected by changes of the alpine tundra are identified by overlaying 
projected alpine tundra changes with the map of Natura 2000 sites. More details in Barredo et al. (2020).  
Forest ecosystems 
The vulnerability of European forests to three major natural disturbances is assessed: fires, windstorms and 
insect outbreaks. For each disturbance type, a multi-variate regression model is derived to predict biomass 
losses based on a number of forest, climate and landscape parameters. Forest features include vegetation 
parameters describing the forest state and productivity, such as biomass, growing stock volume, leaf area index, 
tree age, tree density and tree diameter. Climate information includes long term averages of temperature and 
precipitation and anomalies therein in the years preceding the disturbance, as well as extremes of wind and 
aridity in the year of the disturbance. Landscape features include population density, spatial vegetation 
variability metrics and geomorphological parameters. The vulnerability models are calibrated and validated 
using a large set of records of forest areas affected by natural disturbances over the period 2000-2017. More 
details in Forzieri et al. (2020).  
Agriculture 
A spatially-distributed crop model is used to simulate yield for wheat, grain maize, barley, sunflower, winter 
rapeseed and sugar beet. The model uses bias-adjusted daily temperature and precipitation together with other 
meteorological variables (e.g. wind, relative humidity, global radiation) simulated by the climate models. It also 
accounts for the effects on crop growth of elevated atmospheric CO2 concentrations. Water limitation effects 
are evaluated by simulating both potential yield assuming sufficient water for irrigation and rain-fed yield 
(without irrigation).  
A partial equilibrium, large-scale economic, global multi-commodity, agricultural sector model was used to 
assess EU market adjustments (production, land use, consumption, income, prices and trade) in response to 
crop yield changes in the EU and in other parts of the world due to global warming. Yield estimates are obtained 
from an ensemble of global crop models forced by global climate projections, which for the EU partially overlap 
with the European scale crop yield projections. The global models do not consider water availability constraints, 
the effect of elevated atmospheric CO2 concentrations, or changes in crop varieties and sowing dates. More 
details in Hristov et al. (2020).  
Energy supply 
The effects of global warming on energy supply in the EU is assessed using a global energy model. It covers 
the entire energy system, from primary supply (e.g. fossil fuels, renewables) to transformation (power, biofuels, 
hydrogen) and sectoral demand. The following sources of supply are considered: hydro, solar, wind, nuclear, and 
other thermal sources (coal, gas, oil and biomass). The energy model is applied at country scale with a yearly 
time step but accounting for seasonal variability in climate and water availability. Solar and wind production 
are estimated based on efficiency relations with temperature and wind speed respectively. Hydrological 
simulations of the water resources analysis are used to assess hydropower potential, and together with water 
temperatures, also cooling water availability for nuclear and other thermal plants. All power sources are inter-
linked, since the representation of the whole energy sector implies a balance between supply, prices and 
demand. Hence, climate induced changes in the supply of one source can also affect the supply of other energy 
sources. More details in Després and Adamovic (2020).  
Economic integration 
Overall effects on the economy are estimated with a multi-sector, multi-country computable general equilibrium 
model. The model accounts for the direct impacts as estimated by the specific impact models as well as the 
additional indirect effects in the economy due to the cross-sectoral and cross-country or trade adjustments. 
The model uses loss estimates for the following impact categories: agriculture, energy, drought, river flooding, 
coastal flooding, human mortality of temperature extremes, and windstorms. The economic model transmits 
direct economic damage into the economic system through changes in productivity (e.g. due to lower crop yield), 
changes in capital stock (e.g. due to flood impacts) and changes in consumption (e.g. repairing of storm damage 
reduces consumption possibilities of households). The integration in the macro-economic model allows each 
impact to be evaluated in a uniform economic metric, consumer welfare. More details in Szewczyk et al. (2020).  
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3 Climate in Europe with global warming 
The last five years (2015-2019) were the hottest years on record since 1850, when global average temperature 
started being tracked. It is currently estimated to be 1.1°C above pre-industrial times (1850-1900) and 0.2°C 
warmer than 2011-2015 (World Meteorological Organization, 2019). PESETA IV uses the period 1981-2010 as 
a reference, when global average temperature was already 0.8°C higher on average compared to pre-industrial 
times. 
Figure 2 shows the change in annual average temperature and precipitation across Europe between the 
reference period and the three warming scenarios of the project. Even when limiting global warming to 1.5°C 
(or 0.7°C in addition to the average warming over 1981-2010) a large fraction of Europe is projected to face 
an increase in temperature of 1°C or more relative to the reference period. Hence, the magnitude of warming 
is greater than the global average and not uniform over Europe. Under the 2°C and 3°C global warming 
scenarios, the spatial temperature differences become more apparent, with northern Europe and parts of 
southern Europe showing stronger warming. With respect to precipitation, while moderate changes are projected 
up to 2°C, with 3°C global warming more significant differences are projected, with increases for north-central-
eastern Europe and a decline for most parts of the Mediterranean.  
 
 
  
Figure 2. Changes from reference (1981-2010) in annual average temperature (top panels) and precipitation (bottom) for 
the three global warming scenarios used in PESETA IV (1.5°C, 2°C and 3°C warmer than pre-industrial times). 
Figure 3 presents the average summer temperature and precipitation changes with respect to the reference 
period. The projected increase in summer temperature is stronger especially in southern parts of Europe 
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compared to the increase in annual average temperature. In the most northern parts of Europe warming in 
summer is somewhat less compared to the rise in annual average temperature. The increase in summer 
precipitation in northern Europe is also less strong than that in annual terms, while the decrease in summer 
precipitation in southern Europe is much stronger (up to 30%) compared to that on an annual basis (up to 15%). 
Summer precipitation is also projected to decline in western Europe and parts of central and eastern Europe, 
even when annual average precipitation is projected to increase. More details on projected climate in the EU for 
different warming levels can be found in Dosio et al. (2020).      
 
 
 
Figure 3. Changes from reference period (1981-2010) in summer temperature (top panels) and precipitation (bottom) for 
the three global warming scenarios used in PESETA IV (1.5°C, 2°C and 3°C warmer than pre-industrial times). 
 
Figure 4 represents the changes in average temperature and precipitation for the winter season. Milder winter 
temperatures under the 3°C scenario are mainly projected for northern and eastern Europe. Winters will 
generally be wetter in most of Europe, except for the most southern parts of Europe where reductions up to 
25% in winter precipitation are projected. 
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Figure 4. Changes from reference (1981-2010) in winter temperature (top panels) and precipitation (bottom) for the 
three global warming scenarios used in PESETA IV (1.5°C, 2°C and 3°C warmer than pre-industrial times). 
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4 Human impacts from heat and cold extremes 
During intense heatwaves this summer (June and July 2019), all-time temperature records tumbled 
in many locations in Europe. These events are expected to happen more frequently and become 
more intense with climate change. If temperatures could be stabilised with 1.5°C, each year more 
than 100 million Europeans would be exposed to a present intense heatwave (this is a heatwave 
that under present climate is expected to happen once every 50 years), compared to around 10 
million/year now (1981-2010). With 2°C, this increases to 176 million people per year and with 
unmitigated climate change (3°C in 2100) to nearly 300 million/year, or more than half of the 
European population. Without climate mitigation and adaptation, the death-toll from extreme heat 
in the EU could be more than 30 times more than at present by the end of this century. The rise in 
exposure to and deaths from extreme heat is most pronounced in southern Europe. Milder winters 
will reduce significantly exposure to and deaths from extreme cold.  
 
Current effects of heat and cold extremes 
Spells of several consecutive days of unusually high or cold temperatures can have a considerable impact on 
people. Since 1980, heat and cold waves have caused nearly 90,000 fatalities in Europe. A large majority of 
these reported fatalities from temperature extremes relate to heatwaves. The more vulnerable are older people 
and those with diseases who have reduced physiological and behavioural capacity for thermoregulation, as well 
as the poor who have less access to technological means for private extreme temperature mitigation (e.g. 
through air conditioning or thermal insulation).  
 
Projections of future heat and cold extremes 
Global warming will progressively increase the frequency and severity of heatwaves and result in a gradual 
decline in the intensity and frequency of extreme cold spells. Both trends are very strong across the EU, but are 
somewhat more pronounced in southern European countries. In a 3°C warmer climate compared to pre-
industrial times, a current 50-year heatwave may occur almost every year in southern Europe, whereas in other 
regions of Europe such events may happen every 3 to 5 years.   
 
 
Figure 5. Human exposure to and fatalities from heatwaves in Europe. 
 
Future effects of heat and cold extremes 
The projected changes in heatwave hazard leads to a large increase in the number of people exposed to extreme 
heat with global warming (Figure 5). Even when temperatures could be stabilised with 1.5°C, each year more 
than 100 million Europeans are expected to be exposed to a present 50-year heatwave intensity, compared to 
nearly 10 million/year under baseline climate conditions (1981-2010). With 2°C, this grows to nearly 170 
million/year. With unmitigated climate change (3°C in 2100), the number of people annually exposed to this 
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intensity of heat climbs to nearly 300 million per year, meaning that more than half of the European population 
could be exposed each year to a present 50-year heatwave.  
Assuming present vulnerability and no additional adaptation, annual fatalities from extreme heat could rise 
from 2,700 deaths now to nearly 30,000 with 1.5°C global warming, 50,000 with 2°C and 90,000 with 3°C. The 
increase in human exposure to and fatalities from extreme heat is most pronounced in southern European 
countries and the highest number of fatalities will occur in France, Italy and Spain.  
Conversely, milder winters significantly reduce exposure to and fatalities from extreme cold. The population 
expected to be annually exposed to a present 50-year extreme cold (i.e., a cold wave that is expected to happen 
once every 50 years in present climate conditions) is projected to decrease from approximately 10 million in 
the baseline to reach 5 million with 1.5°C (50% reduction), 2.7 million with 2°C (60% reduction) and 1.2 million 
with 3°C (>80% reduction) (Figure 6). The number of reported fatalities associated with extreme cold spells in 
recent years is already much smaller than those from heatwaves (100 fatalities/year over the period 1980-
2016). This will further drop as a result of global warming.  
 
 
Figure 6. Human exposure to and fatalities from cold spells in Europe. 
 
Total effect of climate change on temperature-related premature mortality  
The contribution of extreme temperatures to the overall temperature-related excess mortality is relatively small. 
Hence, although global warming will result in a strong net increase in exposure to and fatalities from 
temperature extremes, this only captures part of the effects of climate change on temperature-related 
premature deaths. The mortality burden attributable to non-extreme below-optimum ambient temperature (i.e. 
temperatures below the optimal temperature for human health but not necessarily extremely cold) will likely 
decrease with global warming, while fatalities linked to non-extreme above-optimum temperatures (i.e. 
temperatures above the optimal temperature for human health but not necessarily extremely hot) will increase. 
As currently most of the temperature-related mortality can be attributed to non-extreme below-optimum 
temperatures (cold) it is unclear what the net effects of climate change will be on total premature temperature-
related human mortality.  
 
Socioeconomic drivers of future human risk of heat and cold extremes  
Population ageing in Europe is a major demographic trend for the coming decades. It could further increase the 
effect on human beings of temperature extremes. Further, increasing urbanisation could amplify the urban heat 
island effect, which causes urban and metropolitan areas to be significantly warmer than their surrounding 
rural areas. The combined effects of heatwaves and air pollution might further exacerbate human stress in 
densely populated areas.  
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Adaptation to temperature extremes  
Even with stringent mitigation action and limiting global warming to 1.5°C or 2°C, the rise in people exposed to 
extreme heat could be manifold. Hence, societies will need to increase their resilience to cope with more 
frequent and intense heatwaves. There exist a wide range of adaptation measures, including improved design 
and insulation of houses, schools and hospitals, education and awareness raising of potential risk factors and 
recommended responses, and early warning systems. It is also important to consider other impacts of extreme 
temperature on ambient air quality, such as ozone pollution under heatwaves, in order to identify the most 
appropriate response. In the medium to long term (5 to 15 years and over 15 years respectively)1, sound urban 
planning should aim to minimise the urban heat island effect. This can be achieved, for example, by increasing 
tree and vegetative cover, installing green or reflecting roofs, or using cool pavements (either reflective or 
permeable). There is a substantial lack of observations and quantitative information on the effectiveness of 
these measures, yet several of them can provide important co-benefits, such as reduced energy-demand of 
thermo-efficient buildings, or water retention and mental health benefits of green spaces.   
 
Approach 
The PESETA IV task on human impacts of heat and cold extremes provides a quantitative assessment of human 
exposure to and mortality from these extremes in Europe. The methodology integrates empirical data on human 
losses from disasters, past climate information, EUROSTAT demographic data and high resolution climate and 
socio-economic projections. As is common to all PESETA IV impact categories, the analysis first evaluates heat 
and cold wave mortality in a comparative static socio-economic setting, therefore only considering the influence 
of the climate change signal. This is done by comparing impacts on the present population under the baseline 
climate (1981-2010) and climate with 1.5°C, 2°C and 3°C global warming above preindustrial levels. In addition, 
we also provide a dynamic socio-economic assessment considering the 2015 Ageing Report projections of 
population, and look at how heat and cold extremes at the different warming levels would impact EU population 
projected for 2050 and 2100. As a 3°C warming scenario is unrealistic by mid-century, only the Paris targets 
are considered in 2050. Our impact estimates assume that the mortality rates that have been derived from 
recent disaster loss records remain unchanged, hence they do not consider adaptation. More details in Naumann 
et al. (2020).  
 
 
 
                                           
1 As defined by CoMO (2016). Mayors Adapt - Reporting Guidelines. Brussels: Covenant of Mayors Office. 
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5 Impacts of windstorms 
Windstorms are amongst the most damaging natural hazards in Europe, with approximately 5 
€billion of estimated annual losses in the EU. The number of reported windstorms has increased 
significantly over the last decades, yet there is no consensus about a climate-induced trend in 
windstorms over Europe. Climate model projections of extreme winds suggest that windstorms will 
not become more intense or happen more frequently with global warming over most of the European 
land. As a consequence, it is expected that risk from windstorms in the EU will not rise due to 
climate change. In case of no adaptation, economic loses from extreme winds will rise due to 
increasing asset values. Impacts of wind extremes could be reduced by a range of measures, such 
as the development and implementation of enhanced windstorm-resilient standards and building 
codes. 
 
Current effects of windstorms 
During the last few decades, Europe was hit by a number of highly damaging windstorms that caused a 
considerable human and economic impact, ranging from human fatalities and injuries to damage to roads, 
power plants, the agriculture sector, forests, infrastructure, and private properties. Estimated average annual 
losses for EU and UK amount to 5 €billion/year (in 2015 values), or approximately 0.04% of total GDP (of 2015). 
Absolute losses are highest in Germany (850 €million/year), France (680 €million/year), Italy (540 €million/year) 
and the UK (530 €million/year), while impacts relative to the size of the economy are double the EU average in 
Bulgaria and Estonia (0.08% of GDP), and 0.07% of GDP in Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia. Each year 
approximately 16 million EU citizens are exposed to windstorms with an intensity that happens only once every 
30 years in the present climate, resulting in nearly 80 annual deaths. While in tropical regions an increase in 
the frequency and intensity of cyclones has been observed in the last decades, in particular from the 1990’s, in 
Europe there is no robust trend in windstorms.  
 
 
Figure 7. Area fraction (in %) of each region (northern Europe, central-western Europe, eastern Europe, southern Europe) 
with a significant increase (dark blue), no change (grey) and decrease (light blue) in 100-year wind speed (change is 
significant if > 0.3 m/s and 2/3 models agree on sign of change) and number of calm days (change is significant if > 5 
days and 2/3 models agree on sign of change). Inner (outer) circle represents 1.5°C (3°C) warming. 
 
Wind hazard across Europe in a warmer climate 
Present climate model projections suggest small changes in wind hazard with global warming in Europe. With 
3°C warming, maximum wind speeds will likely reduce over 16% of the land area, increase over nearly 10% 
and remain relatively stable over the rest of Europe. Southern Europe is the region with the largest share of the 
area with an increase in wind extremes (17% with 3°C), while central-western Europe has the largest share of 
land for which less intense wind extremes are projected (24% with 3°C). Also the number of windy or stormy 
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days does not show significant changes. On the other hand, there is a robust tendency projected towards more 
calm days (daily maximum wind speed below 3.5 m/s) over most of Europe, in particular over central, western 
and eastern Europe (Figure 7).  
 
Economic losses from windstorms assuming no socioeconomic change 
The lack of a significant trend in wind hazard with global warming across Europe implies that human and 
economic impacts in the EU will remain stable when assuming that current socioeconomic conditions continue 
into the future (Figure 8). For most countries impacts remain stable, although losses could grow to 0.08% of 
the country GDP (of 2015) in Hungary, Romania and Slovakia with 3°C global warming, compared to 0.06% 
under the present climate. In Estonia, on the other hand, losses could drop from 0.08% of GDP under present 
climate to 0.05% of GDP with 3°C global warming.  
 
 
Figure 8. Annual wind losses for the EU and UK assuming that current socioeconomic conditions continue into the future. 
 
Economic losses from windstorms with socioeconomic change 
The projected losses in absolute terms are larger when future socioeconomic change is accounted for compared 
to when the current socioeconomic conditions are assumed to continue into the future, because of the growth 
of the size of the economy and hence higher values of the exposed assets. By 2050, windstorm annual losses 
are projected to grow to nearly 7 €billion/year (in 2015 values) for both 1.5°C and 2°C global warming. By the 
end of this century this further grows to more than 11 €billion/year, with slightly higher impacts for higher 
levels of warming (Figure 9). Future wind-induced damage expressed as a share of the size of future economies 
show a small decrease because building stock and replacement costs grow somewhat slower than GDP.   
 
 
Figure 9. Annual wind losses for the EU and UK assuming socioeconomic conditions in 2100 according to the ECFIN 
Ageing Report. 
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Resilience to wind extremes 
Even though our projections indicate that wind hazard and risk are unlikely to change in Europe with global 
warming, increasing resilience to present wind extremes could further reduce impacts on future societies. There 
are a wide range of measures that could be taken, such as increasing windstorm forecast accuracy and warning 
time, improving storm readiness, emergency communications and response, as well as structural measures for 
wind-proofing infrastructures, which in the EU could be stimulated by amendments of Eurocodes. 
 
Approach 
Projections of daily wind speed under a high emissions scenario (RCP8.5) and moderate mitigation scenario 
(RCP4.5) were used in order to estimate changes in wind hazard between baseline (1981-2010) climate and at 
global warming levels of 1.5°C, 2°C and 3°C above preindustrial levels. Wind damage functions, which relate 
the total construction stock with wind speed and economic losses, as well as reported fatalities, were derived 
from past wind events and their reported impacts. In the absence of information on future vulnerability, these 
impact relations were kept constant in the scenarios. The damage and mortality relations were then applied in 
a static-economic scenario, in which wind hazard at the different warming levels was applied to the present 
population and construction stock. We also combined the projections of wind hazard at the warming levels with 
projections of exposed construction assets and population in 2050 and 2100 according to the ECFIN Ageing 
Report. As it is very unlikely that 3°C warming will happen by mid-century, this warming level was only combined 
with 2100 society in the dynamic economic scenario. The use of the static and dynamic economic scenarios 
allows disentangling the effects of climate change and exposure dynamics on future windstorm losses.  
An important limitation of the analysis is the spatial resolution of the wind data, which is too coarse to capture 
severe local windstorms. The current generation of climate models also have a rather poor physical 
representation of wind dynamics. Further, in the absence of wind gust data at sub-daily time steps we used 
daily maximum wind speed as a proxy of windstorms. It is yet unclear if these limitations affect current 
projections of wind hazard in view of global warming. More details in Spinoni et al. (2020).  
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6 Impacts on water resources 
The long-term imbalance resulting from water demand exceeding available renewable water 
resources is an increasingly frequent and widespread phenomenon in the EU. The number of people 
in the EU and UK who are living in areas that are considered to be under water stress for at least 
one month per year could rise from 52 million nowadays to 65 million in a 3°C warming scenario, 
which is equivalent to 15% of the EU population. In general, climate projections reveal a north-
south pattern across Europe for water availability. Overall, southern European countries, which 
already suffer most from water scarcity, are projected to face decreasing water availability, 
particularly Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Italy. Mitigation alone is not enough to avoid adverse 
climate change impacts and adaptation strategies will be needed too. 
 
Water scarcity is already an issue in the EU 
There are currently around 52 million people in the EU and UK living in water scarce regions. This is equivalent 
to 11% of the population. Most of the people exposed to water stress live in countries in southern Europe, 
including Spain (22 million; 50% of the national population), Italy (15 million; 26%), Greece (5.4 million; 49%) 
and Portugal (3.9 million; 41%). The entire populations of Cyprus and Malta are considered to be living in water 
scarcity. In the Mediterranean the period of water stress can exceed 5 months (Figure 10). During summer, 
water exploitation in this region can be close to 100%, meaning that all possible water is being used, and often 
also a substantial amount of fossil groundwater.  
 
 
Figure 10. Number of water scarce days (WEI+ greater than 0.2, see Approach) in reference period and projected changes 
in with global warming. 
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Current pressures on water resources are exacerbated in southern Europe 
A clear north-south pattern of change in water stress is projected with global warming. Water scarcity conditions 
will worsen in regions that already face water stress now. The number of days with conditions that are 
considered to represent water stress increases sharply around the Mediterranean region with increasing global 
warming (Figure 10). In the Iberian Peninsula water scarce days can increase by up to more than one month 
per year in the 3°C warming scenario relative to present. Areas that will increasingly face water stress with 
warming also emerge in countries further north like the UK, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Denmark, 
Bulgaria, Romania and France. Other central and northern European countries show a trend towards increasing 
water availability with global warming. 
 
Population exposed to water scarcity due to climate change 
The number of people living in areas with water resources under stress increases to 65 million with 3°C global 
warming. This is 13 million (+25%) more than at present, with nearly 8 million people more living in areas with 
severe conditions of water stress, or nearly four times more than at present. Limiting global warming to 1.5°C 
would halve the increase in number of people living in water scarce areas and effectively avoid any additional 
people facing severe or unsustainable water stress (Figure 11).     
Spain sees the largest absolute increase in the number of people living in areas with water resources under 
stress. In the 3°C warming scenario these amount to over 7 million more that at present. In Greece the number 
of people facing water stress would grow with by 3.5 million to nearly 9 million with 3°C warming, or about 
80% of the present population.  
 
 
Figure 11. Population in EU and UK living in areas with water stress  (WEI+ > 0.2, see Approach) and severe (WEI+ > 0.4) 
water stress for different levels of global warming. 
 
Socioeconomic drivers of water scarcity 
Climate change is the main driver of increasing water stress in southern Europe. Demographic changes, land 
use dynamics and corresponding water usage variations play a minor role. In general the additional number of 
people exposed to water scarcity is somewhat higher compared to the static population scenario due to 
projected population growth in countries exposed to water stress (e.g. France). The number of people exposed 
to severe water shortage is slightly lower when accounting for demographic trends due to a projected decline 
in population in countries also exposed to severe water limitations (e.g. Greece). Projections of economic growth 
everywhere in EU result in a strong increase in economic activity exposed to water stress.   
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The need for adaptation 
The severity of some of the projected changes in water availability suggests that various adaptation 
mechanisms will be needed to lessen the effects on population and economic activities exposed to water 
scarcity, even under lower magnitudes of warming. In some regions, projected increases in water dependency 
on upstream water requires further water diplomacy efforts between countries as well as international multi-
member-state management of river basin water resources. In the EU, this is already operational under the 
Water Framework Directive and in various River Basin Commissions, such as for the Danube, Rhine, Elbe, Meuse, 
Oder, Sava and others.  
Adaptation could be targeted at demand-driven scarcity, rather than increasing supply, as this may further 
increase water dependency. Supply side measures also have known detrimental environmental effects 
(reservoirs) or increased energy requirements (desalination). Imbalanced water demand can only be alleviated 
in a sustainable manner by lowering water dependency in water-intensive sectors. Water pricing could create 
an incentive for users to consider water savings and develop water-conserving technologies. Among the wide 
range of possible measures, this includes for example, increasing irrigation efficiency by changing irrigation 
methods (e.g. from sprinkling to drip irrigation), or shifts to crops with lower water requirements. Furthermore, 
sub-optimal irrigation strategies may lead to substantial water savings with only limited reductions in crop yield. 
Other options include more efficient cooling technologies that lead to a reduction in water use for producing 
energy. In addition, shifts from conventional energy production (fossil fuel) to renewable energy production 
(wind and solar) could reduce cooling water demand and net water consumption. 
 
Approach 
PESETA IV estimated the impact of climate change on water availability using the same hydrological model that 
was used elsewhere in the project to assess drought, river flooding, and energy supply impacts. The LISFLOOD 
hydrological and water use model was forced by climate projections for a high emissions (RCP8.5) and 
moderate-mitigation (RCP4.5) scenario to simulate river flow for present climate and climate with 1.5°C, 2°C 
and 3°C global warming above preindustrial levels. The Water Exploitation Index (WEI+), or withdrawal ratio, is 
a metric of water stress that is defined as the percentage of total renewable freshwater resources used in a 
defined territory in a given period. The WEI+ takes into account inflowing river water from cross-border river 
basins. It was calculated at monthly scale. WEI+ values have a range between 0 and 1. Values above 0.2 indicate 
that water resources are under stress, while values above 0.4 indicate severe stress and an unsustainable use 
of freshwater resources. PESETA IV estimated population exposure to water stress for the baseline and 1.5°C, 
2°C and 3°C global warming by calculating the number of people living in areas with an average annual WEI+ 
larger than 0.2, and above 0.4 for severe water stress. Water stress exposure was estimated under two main 
assumptions of socioeconomic change: 1) a continuation of present conditions into the future; and 2) 
socioeconomic development according to the ECFIN Ageing Report. More details in Bisselink et al. (2020).  
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7 Impacts of droughts 
Droughts induce a complex web of impacts that span many sectors of the economy, as exemplified 
by extensive crop failure, reduced power supply, and shipping interruptions in the EU during 2018 
and 2019. With global warming droughts will happen more frequent, last longer and become more 
intense in southern and western parts of Europe, while drought conditions will become less extreme 
in northern and north-eastern Europe. With 3°C global warming in 2100 drought losses could be 5 
times higher compared to today, with the strongest increase in drought losses projected in the 
Mediterranean and Atlantic regions of Europe. When expressed with respect to the total size of the 
economy the effects are dampened relatively, because drought-sensitive sectors like agriculture 
are projected to become relatively less economically prevalent in future EU economies than they 
are nowadays. The consequences on ecosystems are typically not monetized and hence are not 
reflected in the loss estimates.    
 
Current economic losses from drought 
PESETA IV estimates current annual losses from drought to be around 9 €billion for the EU and UK, with the 
highest losses in Spain (1.5 €billion/year), Italy (1.4 €billion/year) and France (1.2 €billion/year). Depending on 
the region, between 39-60% of the losses relate to agriculture and 22-48% to the energy sector. Public water 
supply accounts for between 9-20% of the total damage. Losses in the transport sector relate only to inland 
water transportation and on average represent 1.5% of total losses, while subsidence damage to infrastructures 
accounts for around 8% of total losses. Drought also affects the environment in many different ways, yet these 
impacts are difficult to valuate.  
 
 
Figure 12. Fraction of area exposed to changes in drought occurrence compared to 1981-2010 for European sub-regions. 
 
Drought hazard across Europe in a warmer climate 
Hydrological droughts will progressively happen more frequently and intensify in Mediterranean and Atlantic 
European regions with global warming. Drought conditions will also worsen in southern parts of the Continental 
region. With 3°C warming drought frequency is projected to double over nearly 25% of the Mediterranean and 
15% Atlantic region. Limiting global warming to 1.5°C would still result in an increase in drought frequency over 
two-thirds of the Mediterranean and one-third of the Atlantic region, but would avoid a doubling of drought 
frequency everywhere in Europe (Figure 12). In contrast, in Boreal Europe and the north-eastern parts of 
Continental Europe drought hazard will decline due to increasing precipitation with climate change. In central 
and eastern Europe the projected trends show more climate variability and are more uncertain.  
Increase in frequencyDoubling in frequency Decrease in frequency Halving in frequencyUncertain change
Fraction (%) of area 
exposed per region
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
1.5°C 2°C 3°C
MEDITERRANEAN
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
1.5°C 2°C 3°C
ATLANTIC
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
1.5°C 2°C 3°C
CONTINENTAL
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
1.5°C 2°C 3°C
BOREAL
 33 
 
Economic losses from droughts assuming no socioeconomic change 
If future climate would act on today’s society, total EU and UK drought damage slightly increases with global 
warming of 1.5°C (9.7 €billion/year) but then increases stronger with further warming to reach 17.3 €billion/year 
at 3°C (Figure 13). The Mediterranean and Atlantic regions see the largest losses from global warming (Figure 
14), with Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and the UK showing the strongest increase in losses relative to now. 
Countries in Atlantic and especially Mediterranean Europe already suffer the highest drought impacts. These 
regions contribute to 68% of the total European losses in the recent past and their share progressively increases 
with warming and could grow to 85% at 3°C warming. Drought losses will also increase in the most southern 
countries of Continental Europe (Bulgaria and Romania). 
 
 
 
Figure 13. Average annual 
losses from drought for the 
EU +UK assuming that current 
socioeconomic conditions 
continue into the future. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14. Current 
annual losses (EAD, € 
billion/year, 2015 
values) and with global 
warming for EU 
countries + UK by 
region, assuming that 
current socio-
economic conditions 
continue into the 
future. The top of each 
bar shows the average 
estimate and the 
vertical lines indicate 
climate uncertainty.   
 
Economic losses from droughts with socioeconomic change 
The projected losses in absolute terms are larger when future socioeconomic change is accounted for compared 
to when it is assumed that current socioeconomic conditions continue into the future, because of the growth of 
the size of the economy. By the end of this century, 3°C global warming would result in drought losses of 45 
€billion/year in the EU and UK, compared to 25 and 31 €billion/year for 1.5°C and 2°C, respectively (Figure 15).  
When drought losses are expressed relative to the size of the economy (share of GDP) the effects of climate 
change are dampened compared to the absolute estimates because drought-sensitive sectors, and especially 
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agriculture, are projected to become less economically prevalent in future EU economies. Losses from drought 
account for 0.06% and 0.07% of the EU+UK GDP in 2050 and 2100 under both the 1.5°C and 2°C warming 
scenarios respectively, and 0.1% in 2100 for 3°C warming, compared to 0.07% nowadays. Regional and 
national-level relative impacts can be greater than the EU average, with losses of 0.19% of GDP in the 
Mediterranean for 3°C warming with 2100 socioeconomics, and in some countries even above 0.3% (e.g., Greece 
Bulgaria and Romania). Sector-level impacts can also be much greater, with losses to agriculture amounting to 
4.6% of sector economic output at 3°C of warming.  
 
 
 
Figure 15. Average annual 
losses from drought for the EU 
and UK assuming 
socioeconomic conditions in 
2100 according to the 2015 
Ageing Report. 
 
 
Adaptation and resilience to drought 
The PESETA IV drought impact projections are based on present vulnerability estimates of sectors to drought 
and hence assume no adaptation. There exists a wide variety of drought risk mitigation measures. Rather than 
supply-side measures, which can lead to higher dependence on water resources and increase drought 
vulnerability, adaptation should be targeted at strengthening drought resilience of society and sectors. This 
includes specific measures in drought-sensitive sectors, such as improved cooling techniques, drought-resistant 
crops, or lighter river navigation vessels, but also institutional transformations, livelihood and economic 
diversification, insurance and other market tools, social safety nets, monitoring and data collection, and early 
warning and alert systems. Evaluating the costs and benefits of investments made and policy actions taken to 
mitigate drought impacts remains a huge challenge. Yet, it is generally accepted that the costs of action are 
usually lower than the costs of inaction, and the returns from investing in ex-ante risk management actions are 
higher than those of investing in ex-post crisis management. The actual costs and benefits of adaptation 
measures will vary substantially depending on the local geographical, climate, and socioeconomic conditions. 
 
Approach 
The LISFLOOD hydrological and water use model was run using climate projections for a high emissions (RCP8.5) 
and moderate-mitigation (RCP4.5) scenario to simulate minimum river flow (an indicator of drought hazard) for 
present climate and climate with 1.5°C, 2°C and 3°C global warming above preindustrial levels. Drought hazard 
was estimated at high spatial resolution. Economic losses were estimated at country scale based on a statistical 
relationship between drought intensity and drought impact derived from reported losses of past drought events. 
Drought impacts were disaggregated over economic sectors based on expert-derived sector sensitivity to 
drought and their economic output. Losses are reported in € 2015 values and are inherently uncertain due to 
limited availability of data on past droughts and their impacts upon which the statistical relationship was 
derived. Losses were estimated under two main assumptions of socioeconomic change: 1) a continuation of 
2015 conditions into the future; and 2) socioeconomic development according to the ECFIN Ageing Report. As it 
is very unlikely that 3°C warming will happen by mid-century, this warming level was only combined with 2100 
socioeconomic conditions in the dynamic economic scenario. We present average estimates of drought losses 
over the ensemble of climate models and the spread due to climate uncertainty. Other sources of uncertainty 
due to model conceptualisation and parameterisation, and limited empirical drought loss data are not accounted 
for. More details in Cammalleri et al. (2020).   
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8 River flood impacts and adaptation 
River flooding is one of the costliest natural disasters in Europe. Global warming and continued 
development in flood prone areas will progressively increase river flood risk. Direct damage from 
flooding could increase 6-fold from present losses by the end of the century in the case of no 
climate mitigation and adaptation. Keeping global warming well below 2°C would halve these 
impacts. Adequate adaptation strategies can further substantially reduce future flood impacts. In 
particular, reducing flood peaks using retention areas and implementing building-based damage 
reduction measures can lower impacts in a cost-efficient way in most EU countries, even to flood 
risk levels that are lower than today. Restoring natural wetlands and floodplains to retain excess 
water also improves the state of water and ecosystems.  
 
Current effects of river flooding 
PESETA IV estimates that at present river flooding causes damage of 7.8 €billion/year in the EU and UK, which 
is equivalent to around 0.06% of current GDP. Moreover, more than 170,000 people every year are exposed to 
river flooding.  
 
Future impacts of river flooding without adaptation 
Global warming will progressively increase flood frequency and severity in most of Europe. At the same time, 
the projected social and economic growth will further increase exposure to flood events. If no mitigation and 
adaptation measures are taken, economic losses will grow to nearly 50 €billion/year with 3°C global warming 
by the end of this century, or more than 6 times compared to present, while nearly 3 times as many people 
would be exposed to flooding. Limiting global warming to 1.5°C would halve the economic losses and population 
exposure to river flooding relative to unmitigated climate (Figure 16).  
 
 
Figure 16. Annual flood damage and population exposed to river flooding for EU and UK in the present and by 2100 for 
different levels of global warming, with and without adaptation respectively. The “no adaptation” scenario refers to 
present-day flood protection measures. The “adaptation” scenario is based on the implementation of retention areas to 
store excess flood water to a level of protection that maximises their economic benefit. 
 
Avoided river impacts with adaptation 
Adequate flood risk reduction strategies can substantially reduce the projected increase in flood risk with global 
warming. In particular, reducing flood peaks using retention areas shows great potential to lower impacts in a 
cost-efficient way in most EU countries (Figure 18). Implementing this strategy at EU level can reduce the 
economic damage and population exposed by the end of the century by more than 70%, as compared to no 
adaptation (Figure 16). Retention areas have additional benefits, such as restoring the natural functioning of 
floodplain areas and improving ecosystem quality. Strengthening existing dyke systems has lower but still 
favourable benefit-cost ratios (Figure 17), although this can transfer risk downstream. It also tends to stimulate 
further development behind the flood barriers, which can result in catastrophic impacts in case of failure. 
Building-based flood proofing measures can also significantly reduce flood damage typically with limited 
implementation investments. They also do not prevent floods from happening and therefore can only partially 
avoid flood damage. Relocation is the least cost-effective, their implementation costs are subject to large 
variability and they may have lower social acceptance. 
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Strengthening of dyke systems: 
2€ to 2.9€ saved for each € invested 
41% to 68% reduction in economic damage 
41% to 65% reduction in population exposed 
 
Building of retention areas to store flood waters: 
2.9€ to 3.5€ saved for each € invested 
64% to 82% reduction in economic damage 
63% to 81% reduction in population exposed 
 
Damage reduction measures for buildings  
5.2€ saved for each € invested 
Up to 50% reduction in economic damage 
No reduction in people exposed 
 
Relocation to flood-safe areas 
1.2€ saved for each € invested 
17% reduction in economic damage 
16% reduction in population exposed 
Figure 17. Summary of the main outcomes of the analysis of four adaptation strategies considered in 
PESETA IV. Results are averaged at EU level and calculated considering future socioeconomic conditions 
(2100 economy) under 1.5°C, 2°C and 3°C warming scenarios. 
 
 
The present analysis is not designed to replace detailed analyses at local and regional scale, which are necessary 
for an effective and reliable design and implementation of adaptation measures. On the other hand, several 
large European rivers are transnational, therefore our analysis can provide a consistent, pan-European 
framework to evaluate and compare the costs and effectiveness of river flood adaptation measures under 
future scenarios.   
We focused our analyses on adaptation scenarios based on the application of a single type of measure. 
However, a combination of different measures working in synergy and optimised at the level of river basins is 
the best strategy to locally maximise benefits and minimise drawbacks of each measure. Moreover, the cost-
benefit analysis does not include social, environmental and cultural aspects, which would require more complex 
multi-criteria analyses. 
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Figure 18. Comparison of expected annual damage in 2100 assuming no adaptation, and with the implementation of 
three different adaptation strategies. Results are calculated assuming a 2°C warming scenario. 
 
 
Approach 
A comprehensive modelling framework is applied to simulate river flows (LISFLOOD hydrological model), 
analyse the occurrence and intensity of flooding processes, and estimate the impacts on economy and people 
across Europe. We consider future climate scenarios corresponding to an increase of global average 
temperature of 1.5°C, 2°C and 3°C above preindustrial temperature, combined with socioeconomic projections 
according to the ECFIN Ageing Report.  
We focused on four possible adaptation measures: strengthening of existing dyke systems, implementing flood 
damage reduction measures for buildings, building of retention areas to store flood waters, and relocation of 
people and buildings from flood-prone to flood-safe areas. The evaluation of each adaptation strategy is 
performed using a cost-benefit analysis that optimises the overall costs of implementation and avoided 
economic damage over the life time of the measure (up to 2100). The costs were calculated as the sum of 
capital investment costs to implement the measure and maintenance costs. The benefits are the damage 
avoided by implementing the measure, calculated as the difference between future damage with and without 
adaptation respectively.  
Flood losses, costs and benefits are presented undiscounted in general, but in the cost-benefit analysis of 
adaptation future costs and benefits are discounted. The benefit-to-cost ratio, which is the ratio of total benefits 
to total costs, is also based on discounted values and was calculated for each NUTS2 regions and at country 
and EU+UK level. More details in Dottori et al. (2020).  
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9 Coastal flood impacts and adapation 
Around one third of the EU population lives within 50 km of the coast. Extreme sea levels in Europe 
could rise by as much as one metre or more by the end of this century. Without mitigation and 
adaptation measures, annual damage from coastal flooding in the EU and UK could increase sharply 
from 1.4 €billion nowadays to almost 240 €billion by 2100. Around 95% of these impacts could be 
avoided through moderate mitigation and by raising dykes where human settlements and 
economically important areas exist along the coastline. The extent to which adaptation can lessen 
the effects of coastal flooding and at what cost is sensitive to the investment strategy adopted.  
 
Current effects of coastal flooding 
Damage from coastal flooding in the EU and UK currently amounts to 1.4 €billion annually, which is equivalent 
to around 0.01% of current GDP. Almost half of this damage is shared by two countries: the UK (0.4 €billion 
annually) and France (0.2 €billion annually). Around 100,000 people are exposed to coastal flooding every year 
(Figure 19).  
 
Impacts of coastal flooding without adaptation 
Damage from coastal flooding is projected to rise sharply with global warming for all EU countries with a 
coastline and the UK if current levels of coastal protection are not raised. Annual damage grows to 239 €billion 
(0.52% of the EU+UK GDP projected for 2100) and 111 €billion (0.24% GDP) by 2100 under a high emissions 
scenario and a moderate mitigation scenario respectively (Figure 19), when assuming socioeconomic 
development according to the ECFIN Ageing Report. The largest absolute damage levels are projected for 
Germany, Denmark, France, Italy, the Netherlands and UK. For some countries the damage represents a 
considerable proportion of future national GDP, e.g. 4.9% (Cyprus), 3.2% (Greece) and 2.5% (Denmark) by 2100 
(high emissions). Although damage from, and exposure to coastal flooding, is around 50% lower with mitigation 
compared with high emissions, it is still significantly greater than at present. This means appropriate adaptation 
measures are needed to lessen the effects of future climate change along the EU coastline. 
 
 
Figure 19. Annual damage and population exposed to coastal flooding for EU and UK in present and by 2100 under two 
emissions scenarios, with and without adaptation respectively. For adaptation, dykes are raised to a level of protection 
that maximises their economic benefit.  
 
 
Adaptation options to coastal flooding 
There exists a range of adaptation measures to reduce future flood risk in coastal areas. These include natural 
(dunes) and artificial (dykes) structures, beach nourishment, forecasting and warning systems, flood proofing 
of infrastructures, and ultimately retreat from high-risk areas. Nature-based solutions, such as oyster beds, 
wetlands and salt marshes, create multiple benefits in addition to flood protection, such as increasing CO2 
storage, restoration of biodiversity, and offering recreational opportunities. They can also grow over time 
through the trapping of sediments and, thereby, compensate for rising sea levels. However, the projected rises 
in sea level extremes are so pronounced along Europe’s coastlines that where human life may be at risk and 
high density, high value conurbations exist, the use of hard defence elements (dykes) will likely be unavoidable. 
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Figure 20. National annual damage without and with adaptation (high emissions by 2100).  
 
Impacts reduction with adaptation 
If dykes are raised along EU and UK coastlines, to a level of protection for each section that maximises their 
economic benefit (avoided flooding) relative to their cost, then annual flood damage could be reduced 
significantly relative to no adaptation (Figure 19 and Figure 20). Under the high emissions and moderate 
mitigation scenarios in 2100, the damage is reduced by 90% (216 €billion/year) and 89% (97 €billion/year), 
respectively. Likewise, 63% (1.3 million/year) and 59% (0.8 million/year) fewer people would be exposed to 
coastal flooding respectively. The average annual cost of adaptation for the EU and UK over the period 2020-
2100 is 1.9 €billion/year in the high emissions scenario and 1.3 €billion/year in the mitigation scenario. The UK, 
Germany and France have the highest adaptation costs because of higher construction costs and amounts of 
coastline where additional protection is required. The average annual cost of additional coastal protection is 
about two orders lower than the estimated reduction in annual flood losses by the end of the century. This 
means that investing now in coastal protection will have very large (and growing) benefits in the long term.  
The costs and benefits of raising dykes varies strongly between coastal segments in Europe. The presence of 
human settlements makes investing in dykes economically beneficial, typically when population density exceeds 
500 people per km2. In urbanised and economically important areas the benefits of raising dykes tend to be 
several times the costs, which is the case for 19% and 23% of the European coastline under moderate 
mitigation and high emissions, respectively. However, for the rest of Europe’s coasts, additional protection 
against coastal inundation is neither needed nor economically beneficial. This can be either because natural 
barriers will sufficiently safeguard against the projected rise in sea level extremes in areas with steep 
morphology, or because costs of raising dykes outweigh the benefits, which can happen in sparsely populated 
areas and along complex, winding coastlines.  
The average rise in coastal defence height where further protection is needed in the EU is 100 and 84 cm under 
a high emissions and moderate mitigation scenario respectively. In Belgium this is even more than two metres, 
and also in Slovenia, Latvia, Poland, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK additional protection well above one 
metre will be required. This implies that along many densely populated and economically pivotal coastal 
stretches of the EU the shoreline may become disconnected from hinterland areas.   
 
Factors that control costs and benefits of raising dykes 
The results of the cost and benefit analysis are sensitive to some implementation choices. Shoreline length 
applies a critical control on the costs of dyke upgrades, which could be reduced substantially in areas with highly 
fractal coastlines by installing defences further inland. The outcomes are also very sensitive to discounting, 
which gives more weight to present capital costs and downgrades the benefits that will mostly come later in 
the century. We used discount rates in line with the EC Guide to Cost-Benefit Analysis of Investment Projects 
that were assumed constant in time. Using lower or time-declining social discount rates strengthens the case 
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that we should act now to protect future generations. Similarly, dyke heights are optimised here considering the 
most likely projection of future extreme sea levels. Decision-makers could select a more conservative criterion 
and aim to protect against the high-end, less probable future extreme sea level scenarios. This would require 
higher investments but imply less risk for future generations.  
Impacts of climate change on coastal zones are not limited to growing coastal flood risk. Coastlines will also 
be subject to increased potential of erosion, the loss of low-lying coastal ecosystems, and landward intrusion 
of saltwater, some of which can also be mitigated by raising dykes. Direct damage to port and maritime 
infrastructure are also not fully captured. In addition, the present assessment is limited to the 21st century, but 
sea levels and consequent flood risk are expected to continue to rise well beyond 2100, even with accelerated 
rates. Including these effects would render additional protection as even more economically beneficial.  
 
Approach 
Projections of sea level rise, waves, storm surges and tides under a high emissions scenario (RCP8.5) and 
moderate mitigation scenario (RCP4.5) respectively, were used to estimate extreme sea levels up to the end of 
this century. These were used to generate flood inundation maps from which population exposure and damage 
were estimated using depth-damage functions. Future changes in population and economic activities are those 
from the ECFIN Ageing Report. 
The level of adaptation (i.e. height in cm of raising dykes) was determined for each section of coastline by 
identifying the raised height that maximises the sum over the project lifetime (up to 2100) of the costs and 
benefits associated with the investment, assuming discount rates of 5% (Cohesion Fund countries) and 3% 
(other Member States). The costs were calculated as the sum of national-level capital investment costs to raise 
dykes and maintenance costs. The benefits are the damage avoided by increasing the dyke height, calculated 
as the difference between future damage with and without raised dykes respectively. Flood losses, costs and 
benefits are presented undiscounted in general, but in the cost-benefit analysis of adaptation future costs and 
benefits are discounted. The benefit-cost ratio, which is the ratio of total benefits to total costs, is also based 
on discounted values and was calculated for each section of national coastline, at NUTS2, country and EU+UK 
level. More details in Vousdoukas et al. (2020).  
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10 Wildfire danger and vulnerability 
In 2018 more EU countries than ever were hit by wildfires, with Sweden experiencing the worst fire 
season in reporting history1. In the first half year of 2019 the number of fires recorded in the EU 
was three times the average over the past decade. Changing weather conditions associated with 
global warming could further increase fire danger in most of Europe. The projected increase in fire 
danger is strongest in southern European countries, where fires are already frequent and intense. 
The number of people living near wildland and exposed to high-to-extreme fire danger levels for at 
least 10 days per year would grow by 15 million (+24%) with 3°C warming, compared to now. 
Climate change would also result in major shifts in the locations of current ecological domains and 
induce stress on the structure and composition of vegetation, leading to increased vegetation 
vulnerability to fires. Mitigation alone is not enough to avoid adverse climate change impacts and 
adaptation strategies will be needed in order to enhance social–ecological resilience to wildfires. 
 
Wildfires in Europe today 
In recent years, large wildfires have repeatedly affected Europe. Mediterranean countries like Portugal, Spain, 
Italy, Greece and France, are currently most prone to fires and account for around 85% of the total burnt area 
in Europe. In these countries, fires destroyed nearly half a million hectares per year on average between 1999 
and 2016. In 2017, the worst year over the last two decades, the total burnt area in Portugal, Spain, and Italy 
alone exceeded 0.8 million hectares. In 2018, vulnerable ecosystems of the Natura 2000 network, home to 
several endangered plant and animal species, lost 50,000 hectares to fires, accounting for approximately one 
third of the total burnt area. 
 
 
Figure 21. Additional number of days per year with high-to-extreme fire danger (daily Fire Weather Index ≥ 30, see 
Approach) for different levels of global warming compared to present (1981-2010). 
 
Wildfire danger on the rise with global warming  
The number of days per year with high to extreme wildfire danger is projected to rise nearly everywhere in 
Europe with global warming as a result of higher temperatures and increased spells of dryness (Figure 21). 
Only in scattered parts of northern Europe (the area around and south of the Baltic Sea) are the number of high 
to extreme fire danger days projected to decrease slightly. Fire danger will worsen especially in southern regions 
of Europe that already face high fire danger conditions more often. Although the projected worsening of fire 
danger is smaller with 1.5°C global warming, relative to 2°C or 3°C warming, fire danger would still be 
                                           
1 San-Miguel-Ayanz, J., Houston-Durrant, T., Boca, R., Libertà, G., Branco, A., de Rigo, D., Ferrari, D., 2019. Forest fires in Europe, Middle East 
and North Africa 2018. Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. 
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consistently worse compared to present. This suggests that mitigation alone will not be sufficient to lessen 
possible impacts of climate change.  
 
Population in Wildland-Urban Interface exposed to fire danger  
The number of European1 citizens living near wildland and exposed to at least 10 days of high-to-extreme fire 
danger per year is projected to increase from 63 million in the present to 78 million with 3°C global warming, 
an increase of 15 million people (24%). When global warming is restricted to 1.5°C, an additional 5 million 
people would be exposed compared to now, or approximately 10 million fewer people compared with no 
mitigation.     
 
Climate change will exert stress on ecosystems and increase their vulnerability to fires  
Global warming could result in a substantial shift northwards of European ecological domains (Figure 22). This 
results in a substantial contraction of the Boreal domain, as the Temperate domain migrates to the north. The 
Subtropical domain is projected to expand around the Mediterranean region and to contract in southern parts 
of the Mediterranean region, where the Tropical domain, currently absent in Europe, is expected to encroach 
and could become a significant ecological component. The degree of change in ecological domain components 
increases with the level of warming and could be considerably halted with climate mitigation.  
 
 
Figure 22. Projected changes in ecological domain components with global warming, relative to present (1981-2010). 
                                           
1 Statistics based on available data for countries in EU, UK and EFTA, candidate countries and potential candidates. 
 43 
 
The projected changes (both expansions and contractions) will have a direct influence on the structure and 
composition of wildland vegetation (forests, shrub and grassland) and corresponding fuel characteristics. This 
may exert stress on the vegetation and increase their vulnerability to fires, but also affect vegetation recovery 
after the fire. Recovery could become impossible where the intensity of eco-domain shift would prevent pre-
fire ecosystems from re-establishing.   
 
The need for adaptation  
The projected increase in fire-conducive climate conditions in many regions of Europe, even under the lower 
levels of global warming, suggests that various adaptation mechanisms will be needed to lessen the potential 
effects of wildfires on people and ecosystems. Most fire ignitions in Europe are linked to human actions, 
including negligence and arson. Awareness campaigns and wildfire prevention programmes could help to reduce 
the number of human-ignited wildfires. Active forest management practices can also counteract the impacts of 
a changing climate. For example, fuel reduction management or prescribed burning can limit the build-up of 
fuels and decrease forest vulnerability. Where feasible and subject to the constraints imposed by ecological 
domain shifts, changing to less flammable species (e.g. from conifers to deciduous) and recreating mixed 
forests might be also a viable option in the longer term. Through adequate landscape management, natural fire 
breaks (e.g. agricultural land) can be created to prevent the spread of fire and reduce the area burned. Finally, 
increasing awareness on health hazards from smoke plumes from fires in the immediate vicinity and at larger 
distances could mitigate human impacts, especially for citizens with pre-existing health conditions, and those 
operating in wildfire emergency response.  
 
Approach 
PESETA IV estimated components of wildfire danger and vegetation fuel vulnerability for present climate and 
for 1.5°C, 2°C and 3°C of global warming above preindustrial levels using an ensemble of bias-corrected climate 
projections for a high emissions (RCP8.5) scenario and a moderate-mitigation (RCP4.5) scenario.  
The Canadian Fire Weather Index (FWI) was used to estimate numerically the weather-driven fire danger using 
simulations of temperature, wind speed, relative humidity and precipitation. The FWI rates fire intensity by 
integrating the effects of fuel moisture and wind on fire behaviour. It was calculated at high spatial resolution 
and at a daily time step, taking into account weather conditions in preceding days. The daily fire danger 
estimates were grouped in classes of fire danger from days with low danger up to days with extreme danger. 
Values of FWI above 20 are associated with high fire danger, while values exceeding 50 typically characterise 
extreme danger conditions. The probability of occurrence of each class was calculated as the number of days 
per year that the FWI falls within the range of the respective class. The number of people living in the vulnerable 
interface between wildland and settlements (Wildland-Urban Interface) was assessed at high-resolution by 
combining land use information and population density maps. 
Potential shifts of ecological domains due to global warming are an indication of future vegetation vulnerability 
to fire. Changes in the spatial distribution of tropical, subtropical, temperate and Boreal ecological domains 
(following the global definition of the UN Food and Agriculture Organization) and local ecological patterns were 
assessed based on the temperature projections. More details in Costa et al. (2020).  
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11 Alpine tundra habitat loss 
The alpine tundra domain occurs at altitude in the high mountains in Europe. It is an important 
reservoir of freshwater and provides habitat to unique species. The treeline, which is below the 
domain, represents the forest limit. About 98% of Europe's alpine tundra domain is in the Pyrenees, 
Alps and Scandes. In a 3°C warming scenario, the natural climatic treeline is projected to move 
vertically upwards by up to 8 metres per year and over Europe the domain could shrink by 84% of 
its present size. In the Pyrenees high warming could lead to a near total loss of the alpine tundra. 
Limiting warming to 1.5°C could reduce the loss of alpine tundra to 48%. The projected changes 
have implications for vital ecosystem services, habitat for biodiversity, and recreational services 
such as skiing. Adaptation is challenging because of the unique topographic, soil and climatic 
characteristics of high mountain systems.  
 
Shrinkage of the alpine tundra domain  
Alpine tundra currently covers around 87,000 km2 in Europe, of which around 25,000 km2 in the Alps, 1,800 
km2 in the Pyrenees and 59,000 km2 in the Scandes. This is close to the size of Austria or Portugal. However, 
the domain is projected to shrink significantly with global warming (Figure 23). There are large differences in 
the losses projected for the three main regions that make up the domain: the most severe impact is projected 
for the Pyrenees, where the current domain virtually disappears with 3°C, compared to the Scandes and Alps, 
which would shrink by around 87% and 75% respectively. The magnitude of loss is smaller at lower warming 
levels but it is still significant: with 1.5°C global warming the alpine tundra domain in the Pyrenees, Scandes 
and Alps reduces in area by around 74%, 50% and 36% respectively (Figure 23).  
 
 
Figure 23. Projected shrinkage of alpine tundra (%) compared to present. 
 
Losses of alpine tundra in Natura 2000 sites 
Over 16,000 km2 of current alpine tundra domain are Natura 2000 sites, a network of nature protection sites 
established under the EU Habitats Directive, approximately 20% of the total extent of the current alpine tundra 
domain. Of the 210 sites that contain alpine tundra, almost all of them are projected to see a shrinking of the 
domain: 207 and 208 in the 2°C and 3°C warming scenarios respectively. The magnitude of shrinkage is already 
significant under the 1.5°C warming scenario: the current domain within Natura 2000 sites shrinks by between 
36% (Alps) and 73% (Pyrenees; Figure 24). The contraction increases gradually with warming, and in the 3°C 
warming scenario the current domain inside Natura 2000 sites shrinks by over 74% in all three of the mountain 
regions where most of Europe's alpine tundra is currently found. With unmitigated climate change practically 
all alpine tundra Natura 2000 sites in the Pyrenees could be lost.   
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Figure 24. Projected shrinkage of alpine tundra within Natura 2000 sites (%) compared to present. 
 
Vertical shifts in the treeline 
The natural climatic treeline is projected to gradually advance vertically upward in mountain regions of Europe 
with global warming (Figure 25). The rate of treeline shift generally increases at lower latitudes, where climatic 
treelines are already higher. In the southernmost mountain regions the treeline moves upwards by around 6-7 
m every year in the 1.5°C warming scenario, compared to 2-3 m/year at high latitudes. In a 3°C warming 
scenario, the treeline in the Pyrenees could reach 2,317 m compared to 1,675 m now (+642 m). In the Alps, the 
treeline could shift from 1,762 m at present to 2,288 m (+526 m) with 3°C warming, while in the Scandes it 
could climb from 523 m to 859 m (+336 m). 
 
 
Figure 25. Climatic treeline elevation for 16 mountain regions in Europe, currently, and in 1.5°C, 2°C and 3°C warming 
scenarios. White lines group impacts for each region. Solid and dotted lines show best regression fit for each scenario. 
 
Implications and need for adaptation 
Snow retains water above the treeline that is released during the summer months. Shrinkage of the alpine 
tundra domain could alter available water resources downstream in summer months. It is also associated with 
a shrinkage of alpine glaciers, causing debris flows and reductions in water quality due to an increase in the 
amount of sediments in rivers. Cold mountain habitats would decline, leading to local extinction of some alpine 
plant species. Warm-adapted species would increase at the expense of declining cold-adapted species. 
Shrinkage of the alpine tundra domain would likely restrict winter sports.  
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Ecosystem-based adaptation options include ecological restoration, increasing biological diversity, assisted 
migration of threatened species, ecological corridors, ex-situ conservation and seed banks. Several of these 
options face constraints arising from the unique topographic, soil and climatic characteristics of alpine tundra 
regions. Migration of species could be constrained by the lack of sufficient altitude to migrate vertically or due 
to limiting soil conditions for plant growth. The feasibility of the implementation of adaptation measures should 
therefore be assessed at local level. Potential trade-offs between adaptation for nature conservation and 
adaptation for winter tourism should also be considered.  
 
Approach 
PESETA IV assessed the effects of climate change on the spatial range of the alpine tundra zone in the high 
mountain ranges of the Pyrenees, Alps and Scandes. Climate projections under a high emissions scenario 
(RCP8.5) and moderate mitigation scenario (RCP4.5) were used in order to delineate the alpine tundra domain 
for baseline (1981-2010) climate and at global warming of 1.5°C, 2°C and 3°C above preindustrial levels. Alpine 
tundra was mapped using a climate classification equivalent to polar climates, where the mean temperature of 
the warmest month is less than 10°C. The projections of temperature were corrected for bias and downscaled 
to high spatial resolution accounting for altitude effects. Projected changes in the alpine tundra domain were 
then classified in three potential categories: stable, contraction and expansion. Natura 2000 sites projected to 
be affected by changes of the alpine tundra were identified by overlying areas that are projected to remain 
stable, contract or expand with the map of Natura 2000 sites. 
Treeline shifts with global warming are assessed in 16 mountain regions in Europe, from the Mediterranean 
islands to the Boreal and from the Iberian Peninsula to the Carpathians, including the more prominent treeline 
ecotones of Europe. The treeline position was mapped based on a growing season canopy temperature threshold 
of 7.6°C. The impacts of declines in the alpine tundra domain and vertical shifts in the treeline, as well as 
potential adaptation options, were considered by reviewing the available literature – it was not modelled 
specifically by PESETA IV. More details in Barredo et al. (2020).  
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12 Forest ecosystems vulnerability 
Forests cover around one third of the land surface in Europe. They provide key ecosystem services 
that contribute to human well-being and climate mitigation. Forests are vulnerable systems 
because the long life-span of trees limits rapid adaptation to drastic environmental changes. In 
recent years, about 14 billion tonnes of above ground forest biomass in the EU, or two third of total 
stand biomass, was found to be potentially vulnerable to natural disturbances. Hotspot regions 
with forests susceptible to windthrows, fires and insect outbreaks are located in both southern and 
northern Europe. This spatial pattern is strongly controlled by the interplay of forest characteristics 
with the background climate. The combination of rising temperature and changes in precipitation 
in the last two decades have likely reduced plant defence mechanisms and increased their 
vulnerability to insect outbreak disturbances, especially in high-latitude regions. Global warming 
will likely increase natural disturbances in the future, especially those from fires and insect 
outbreaks that are more severely affected by climate. 
 
Forest vulnerability across Europe 
At present around 26 billion tonnes of forest biomass in Europe is potentially vulnerable to natural disturbances. 
Nearly half of that amount (46%) is threatened by windthrows, followed by forest fires (29%) and insect 
outbreaks (25%). There is substantial spatial variation across Europe in the vulnerability of forests to the 
different natural disturbances (Figure 26). Vulnerability to windthrows is higher in northern Europe, prominently 
in Norway, the British Isles, and in southern Europe. In these regions, up to 60% of the stand biomass is 
potentially vulnerable in areas affected by windthrows. A prominent south-north gradient of increasing 
vulnerability to fires and insect outbreaks emerges, with peak values in northern Europe, particularly in the 
Scandinavian Peninsula, and European Russia where areas affected by these disturbances may lose up to 30% 
of stand biomass. 
 
Figure 26. Forest vulnerability to major natural disturbances in Europe, expressed as the share (in %) of biomass that 
would be lost in case of a disturbance. Areas with forest cover fraction lower than 10% are masked out (in grey). 
 
Drivers of forest vulnerability 
Forest characteristics, notably above ground biomass, growing stock volume, leaf area index, tree age and tree 
density, largely control forest vulnerability to fires and windstorms. For these disturbances, forest structural 
characteristics have more important effects than climate and landscape conditions over most of Europe (Figure 
27. Contribution of forest, climate and landscape characteristics to forest vulnerability for three major 
disturbance types.Figure 27), although climate features can exert a strong control on fire disturbance in parts 
of northern Europe and on windthrow disturbance in eastern Russia. For insect outbreaks, climate conditions 
 48 
play a more prominent role. In particular, anomalies in precipitation and temperature are key drivers of forest 
vulnerability to insects in most of northern Europe, alpine regions and European Russia, while forest 
characteristics are critically important in most forests of central and southern regions of Europe. Overall, 
landscape features overall have a minor effect on vulnerability to natural disturbances, with slightly larger 
effects on fires in European Russia and on insect outbreaks in eastern Europe. 
 
Figure 27. Contribution of forest, climate and landscape characteristics to forest vulnerability for three major disturbance 
types. 
 
Trends in forest vulnerability 
Over the last two decades, an increasing amount of forests in Europe has become vulnerable to insect 
outbreaks, particularly in high-latitude areas, showing regional trends that can exceed 0.12 tonnes per square 
hectare per year. No clear trends can be detected in the forest vulnerability to windthrows and fires over this 
period. In fact, the temporal variations in vulnerability to fire and wind disturbances show a mixed spatial 
pattern. When aggregating over Europe and the different disturbances, a clear increasing trend in biomass 
vulnerability emerges for the recent years with a change of about 0.04 tonnes per square hectare per year.  
The wind analysis of PESETA IV shows no clear trend in extreme wind speeds with global warming while the 
forest fire analysis of PESETA IV projects a climate-driven increase in fire danger in most of Europe, especially 
in southern regions. Rising temperatures and more spells of dryness with global warming, especially in southern 
Europe, could lead to increasing biomass loss from insect outbreaks and fires. It is therefore likely that with 
increasing levels of global warming, forest disturbances are more likely to occur.   
 
 
Approach 
The vulnerability of European forests to three major natural disturbances was assessed: fires, windstorms and 
insect outbreaks (bark beetles, defoliators and sucking insects). Vulnerability is expressed here as the degree to 
which forest ecosystems are affected when exposed to a disturbance and it is quantified in relative biomass 
loss. Such estimates should, therefore, not be confounded with risk levels, as they do not integrate information 
on the probability of occurrence of disturbances (hazard). For each disturbance type, a machine learning model 
was derived to predict biomass loss of plant functional types based on a number of forest, climate and 
landscape parameters. Forest characteristics include vegetation parameters describing the forest state and 
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productivity, such as biomass, growing stock volume, leaf area index, tree age, tree density and tree diameter. 
Climate information includes long term averages of temperature and precipitation and anomalies therein in the 
years preceding the disturbance, as well as extremes of wind and aridity in the year of the disturbance. 
Landscape features include population density, spatial vegetation variability metrics and geomorphological 
parameters. The vulnerability models are calibrated and validated using a large set of records of forest areas 
affected by natural disturbances over the period 2000-2017. The vulnerability models were then used to 
extrapolate in space and time the annual vulnerability of forest. Based on the resulting time series, spatial 
patterns and temporal variations in vulnerability were evaluated. More details in Forzieri et al. (2020).  
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13 Impacts on agriculture 
Extreme dry and hot weather spells in recent years have cut agricultural output in important crop 
regions in Europe and around the world. In order to understand how the agriculture sector in the EU 
could be affected by climate change, PESETA IV conducted an integrated quantitative assessment, 
involving climate, biophysical and economic models. In the absence of adaptation, climate change 
is expected to substantially lower grain maize and wheat yields in southern Europe, and to a lesser 
extent grain maize yields in northern Europe. However, EU production could still slightly increase 
due to the interplay of different market forces. This is because the negative effects in Europe are 
projected to be lower compared to the other world regions. This provides the EU a comparative 
advantage in terms of climate change impacts on agricultural productivity, which could positively 
affect its competitiveness. 
 
Climate change driven biophysical impacts in Europe 
Grain maize is an irrigated crop in most of Europe. When assuming that the irrigation infrastructure of nowadays 
remains in place and that sufficient water is available for irrigation (i.e. projecting “potential yields”; top panels 
in Figure 28), climate change will substantially lower yields in most producing EU countries. The most severe 
impacts on irrigated grain maize are projected for southern Europe, where potential yields could decline by more 
than 10% in a 2°C warming scenario. The losses are slightly lower with 1.5°C warming.  
1.5°C           2°C 
 
 
Figure 28. Results of the biophysical assessment, showing ensemble mean changes of grain maize yield relative to 
baseline (%) for 1.5°C (left panels) and 2°C (right panels) warming scenarios, assuming fully irrigated conditions 
(“potential yields”; top panels) or no irrigation in the future (“rain-fed yields”; bottom panels). Hatching denotes areas with 
low agreement in model responses to global warming. 
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Climate change could further restrict the water available for irrigation and result in yields that are lower than 
the potential achievable under full irrigation. Under the extreme assumption of no irrigation in the future, severe 
declines in grain maize yield are projected with global warming (Figure 28, bottom panels). Under such “rain-
fed” conditions, declines in yield of over 20% are projected for all EU countries, with crop losses up to 80% for 
some countries in southern Europe (Portugal, Bulgaria, Greece and Spain). This implies that without market 
adjustments, grain maize production may no longer be viable in areas where there is water scarcity and 
precipitation significantly decreases. 
In contrast to grain maize, wheat is mostly a non-irrigated, rain-fed crop in Europe. Increases in yields by around 
5% on average are projected for northern Europe, due to changes in precipitation regime combined with an 
anticipated growing cycle and enhanced growth from increasing atmospheric CO2 concentrations. Yield 
reductions are projected for southern Europe by 12% on average, corroborating empirical evidence of a limited 
CO2 effect on wheat under limited water conditions. Limiting global warming to 1.5°C could reduce these losses 
by 5%.  
 
Adaptation in Europe 
Adaptation strategies, such as changing sowing dates and the crop variety sown, would not suffice to offset 
the projected strong reduction in grain maize yields. Changing varieties could have a much larger beneficial 
effect on rain-fed wheat production. Plant-breeding, guided by modelling, can identify ‘faster’ wheat varieties, 
which reach the flowering stage earlier. These may lessen the projected yield reduction from climate change 
and in some cases even give rise to an increase in yields. Furthermore, if irrigation infrastructure is built in 
wheat growing areas and assuming there is sufficient water availability, wheat losses could turn into yield gains 
across all of Europe. As climate change progresses, farmers may also decide to grow different crops, which are 
more suited for the new agro-climatic conditions. 
 
Crop production impacts with market adjustments 
The negative effects of climate change on crop yields in the EU as projected by the biophysical models may be 
reduced considerably as a result of market adjustments due to more severe climate change impacts on 
agriculture outside Europe. The differently projected biophysical yield changes across regions will result in 
changes in global production, reflected in positive changes in crop prices. Due to market adjustment effects, the 
price increases will induce changes in EU farmers' management practices (e.g. input use per unit of land) which 
in the end makes yields readjust. For example, with market adjustments, in southern Europe there is a 3% 
increase in grain maize and a 2% increase in wheat production (Figure 29), which is different than the projected 
declines for both crops in the biophysical assessment (Figure 28). In northern Europe, however, the substantial 
increase in wheat yield projected by the biophysical assessment is downsized due to market adjustment. 
Besides the market adjustment effect, there are other methodological limitations that need to be highlighted 
and are responsible for the differences in the biophysical and economic projections. More specifically,  the use 
of different climate and crop models, slightly varying magnitudes of global warming, as well as different 
modelling assumptions around irrigated and rain-fed yields, effect of elevated atmospheric CO2 concentration, 
changes in crop varieties and sowing dates are also responsible for the projected differences between the two 
approaches. 
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Figure 29. Crop yield changes (%) for northern and southern Europe in 2050 relative to the baseline based on biophysical 
modelling (WOFOST, ISI-MIP) and economic modelling (CAPRI) when accounting for market adjustments. Horizontal lines 
show the ensemble median and boxes show the 25th and 75th percentiles. The warming in this scenario in 2050 
corresponds to approximately 2°C. 
 
Approach 
The WOFOST model was used in the biophysical assessment to simulate crop yields across Europe under 1.5°C 
and 2°C warming scenarios derived from 10 regional climate models run for two emission pathways (RCP8.5 
and RCP4.5). Crop growth was affected by elevated CO2 concentrations. Two types of yields were estimated: 1) 
“potential yields”, where it was assumed that current irrigation infrastructure remains in place in the future and 
there is sufficient water available for irrigation; and 2) “rain-fed yields”, where there is no irrigation and 
therefore crops can be affected by water availability constraints. The effects of respectively including and 
excluding adaptation options such as changing sowing dates and crop varieties were explored. The effects of 
nutrient limitations, heat stress at flowering, and pests and diseases were not considered. 
The CAPRI model1 was used to explore the effects of global climate change on European crop production, land 
use, consumption, income, prices and trade. Yields for year 2050 from 7 global crops models, run with five 
global climate models under the RCP8.5 emissions scenario (source: ISIMIP Fast Track database), were used as 
input to CAPRI. WOFOST could not provide climate change yield changes for the rest of world and was therefore 
not added to the model ensembles. For Europe, there is a partial overlap between the ISIMIP and WOFOST crop 
yield projections. The range in global warming across the climate models in 2050 is 1.6-2.7°C. CAPRI did not 
consider water availability constraints, the effect of elevated atmospheric CO2 concentrations, nor changes in 
crop varieties and sowing dates. More details in Hristov et al. (2020).  
 
  
                                           
1 www.capri-model.org 
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14 Impacts on electricity production 
PESETA IV assessed the impacts of climate change on electricity production by hydro, wind, solar, 
nuclear and other thermal power plants, including biomass, coal, gas and oil. We assessed how 
climate change would affect the present power system (static scenario) and the power system of 
2050 in line with 2°C mitigation efforts (dynamic scenario). Under both scenarios, at EU-level 
hydropower increases with global warming while nuclear power decreases. However, there are 
regional differences in the impacts, such as increased hydropower in the north, and a decline in 
hydro and nuclear power in southern Europe due to lower water availability for direct production 
and cooling river-based plants. In northern Europe, the increasing availability of cheaper hydro 
results in substitution effects and lower production costs, while in southern Europe production costs 
could increase. The direct impacts of climate change on wind and solar production are not 
significant. However, in the 2050 power system their capacity would increase in southern regions 
to compensate for the lost hydro and nuclear production. Climate change impacts on energy in the 
rest of the world show a negligible spill-over effect on Europe. Improved cooling technologies have 
the potential to strongly reduce the negative effects of water scarcity, particularly for nuclear 
plants in southern Europe. 
 
Impacts on electricity production 
Global warming results in an overall increase in hydropower production in the EU + UK, especially in northern 
regions that rely heavily on hydropower. On the contrary, nuclear power reduces significantly, while other energy 
sources are only moderately impacted (see Figure 30). 
 
 
Figure 30. Climate change impacts on power production in Europe (median values of climate ensembles). Impacts of 
1.5°C, 2°C and 3°C global warming imposed on today’s power system (static scenario), and impacts of 2°C warming on the 
2050 power system in line with a 2°C mitigation scenario (dynamic scenario), with and without adaptation of water 
cooling. Note: "other thermal" designates biomass, coal, gas and oil plants.  
 
When assuming a static 2020 power system, hydropower production in the EU is expected to increase by 0.9% 
with 1.5°C global warming (median value) and by 2.3% and 3.2% with 2°C and 3°C warming, respectively. 
Nuclear production would decrease by 0.5% with 1.5°C warming and by 1.8% in a 3°C warming static scenario. 
Other thermal, wind and solar plants are barely impacted in the 2020 static study and at EU level. 
The dynamic scenario includes changes in the energy mix in line with a 2°C climate mitigation scenario (see 
Approach). The corresponding 2050 power system will also be impacted by climate change. When comparing 
results in 2050 with and without climate impacts, hydropower production increases by 3.3%, pushing out 
 54 
nuclear (-2.8%) and other thermal production (-0.6%). Wind and solar would develop more (+1.1% for wind and 
+0.7% for solar aggregated over EU + UK), mainly in response to lower hydro and nuclear power production in 
southern Europe. The evolution of the mix is in itself an adaptation of the energy system to climate change. 
The overall increase in hydropower is dominated by increasing water availability in northern European countries 
where there is a high installed capacity for hydropower. Since hydro has a lower marginal cost, it undercuts the 
demand in these regions for power from other energy sources. Depending on the local electricity production 
mix, the substitution effect is different. In the static scenario, hydro mainly replaces biomass in Sweden, coal in 
Finland, oil in Lithuania and gas in Latvia. This leads to annual economic benefits in northern Europe of around 
1.3 €billion (2015 values) with 3°C warming.  
In southern regions of Europe, and particularly the Iberian Peninsula, the projected reduction in water availability 
negatively affects hydro and nuclear production, especially in summer. Thermal plants act as a substitute to 
hydro and nuclear in the Iberian Peninsula: in order to ensure demand in periods of reduced hydro and nuclear 
power, the thermal power capacities in reserve have to increase production. This is more expensive than hydro 
and nuclear power generation, which means that production costs in southern Europe increase by around 0.9 
€billion per year (2015 values) with 3°C warming assuming a static 2020 power system. In the dynamic 
scenarios, this effect is less pronounced because the increased development of wind and solar contributes to 
filling the gap left by hydro and nuclear. 
In other regions of Europe, changes in water availability are less pronounced, with smaller effects on water-
related energy production. As wind and solar are not strongly impacted directly by climate change, the expected 
impacts on power production in these regions is limited.  
 
Adaptation  
In the dynamic scenario, the 2050 energy mix in line with 2°C climate mitigation will further evolve in response 
to climate change impacts (e.g. increased wind and solar installations). When allowing adaptation of nuclear 
and other thermal plants, the mix evolution would be different. Nuclear production is particularly reactive and 
climate change impacts could be almost completely avoided with a switch to less water-intensive cooling 
technologies (reduction of -0.6% instead of -2.8%, see Figure 30), especially in southern parts of Europe. Other 
thermal plants do not show a similar benefit of these adaptation measures, either because they do not operate 
at full capacity or because they are already using efficient cooling technologies. 
 
Spill-over effects 
The spill-over effects from the rest of the world on the EU were also quantified (in “static mode”) and appear 
negligible (less than 0.1%). The main impact at global level is a decrease in fuel consumption and fuel prices 
because of lower heating demand in buildings. Lower fuel prices could potentially create a slight increase of 
demand in Europe, which would be covered by reserve capacities of thermal plants as well as some additional 
decentralised solar capacities. 
 
Implications 
Results of this study suggest that energy policies should consider climate change impacts in their electricity 
production capacity planning. With global warming, hydropower plants will become even more valuable assets 
in central and northern Europe thanks to increased water availability in these regions. On the other hand, in the 
south of Europe (especially the Iberian Peninsula and Greece), reduced water availability will reduce the 
available capacity of hydropower as well as nuclear and thermal plants. Adaptation, through the upgrade to 
less water-intensive cooling technologies, could avoid most of the loss in capacity, especially for nuclear plants 
currently based on once-through river cooling. In northern Europe, nuclear and thermal production could 
decrease due to an increase in hydropower production that has a lower production cost. Finally, wind and solar 
do not appear to be constrained directly by climate change and could benefit from the negative effects on other 
technologies, especially in southern regions during summer periods. Expanding inter-regional electricity 
interconnections is a way to balance the evolving production patterns across Europe and their associated costs. 
For example, with 2°C global warming, electricity production costs could decrease by 2.5% in northern Europe 
and increase by 0.6% in southern Europe as a consequence of the changes in water resources and hydropower 
production, if no additional power trade occurs. 
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Limitations 
The energy supply assessment does not incorporate the effects of climate extremes due to the temporal 
(seasonal) and spatial (country) resolution of the energy analysis. The drought analysis in PESETA IV shows that 
increasing drought conditions with global warming in southern and western regions of Europe will result in 
growing economic losses in the energy sector. Further, increased river and coastal flooding could result in higher 
direct damage to energy infrastructures in flood-prone areas. 
This study assumes that hydropower plants in the EU are not saturated most of the year and that they can 
benefit linearly from increasing water resources. Similarly, the average wind speeds used here impact linearly 
wind power production. Although a single turbine has a typical (non-linear) power curve, the relation is more 
difficult to characterize once the plants of a country are aggregated. The temperature effect on solar PV panels 
does not reflect the (non-linear) heat accumulation effect, which could result in higher efficiency losses than 
when considering the ambient temperature. Finally, the water temperature estimation is based on a linear 
relation with air temperature and lacks a more detailed spatial and temporal modelling. 
 
Approach 
PESETA IV estimates the effects of climate change on electricity production by hydro, wind, solar, nuclear and 
other thermal power plants (biomass, coal, gas and oil). Extreme events such as floods, droughts or windstorms 
can lead to a temporal disruption of electricity production, transmission or demand. Impacts of drought on 
energy production have been quantified in the drought analysis of PESETA IV. However, the required temporal 
and geographical detail is not compatible with the long-term system-wide analysis performed here with the 
energy model POLES (Prospective Outlook on Long-term Energy Systems). Climate change projections (RCP4.5 
and RCP8.5 pathways) and hydrological simulations are identical to those used in the PESETA IV tasks on water 
resources, droughts and river floods. The impacts assessed relate to changes in water resources availability for 
hydropower and cooling nuclear and other thermal plants, changes in wind resources for wind energy, and 
changes in temperature for the efficiency of solar panels. Results are obtained by comparing scenarios with 
and without the climate impacts on electricity production, so that other factors are neutralized (e.g. climate 
impacts on energy demand are modelled but not shown here). 
A number of different scenarios have been considered. A first analysis looks at the impacts of 1.5°C, 2°C and 
3°C global warming on the 2020 power system (energy model used in “static mode”), in order to neutralize 
other effects such as climate policy or natural power mix evolution. In this “static mode” we further quantified 
spill-over effects on the EU caused by climate change impacts on energy production in the rest of the world. 
The energy model was also run in dynamic mode until 2050 corresponding to 2°C compatible mitigation efforts 
and emission pathway (RCP4.5, with stabilized radiative forcing of 4.5 Watts per square metre in 2100, without 
ever exceeding that value) and a changing technical and socioeconomic context according to the ECFIN Ageing 
Report. In this dynamic setting we also quantified the potential of open recirculating cooling (evaporating 
towers) and dry cooling to reduce the negative effects of climate change on thermal plants cooling. More details 
in Després and Adamovic (2020).  
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15 Economic analysis 
Climate change damages the capital stock and affects economic production and the welfare of 
households. For seven climate impact categories these economic effects have been quantified: river 
floods, coastal floods, agriculture, energy supply, droughts, windstorms and human mortality. Due 
to the limited coverage of climate impacts, the assessment does not evaluate the full economic 
impacts of climate change in the EU. Human mortality from extreme heat dominates the economic 
climate impacts, but its contribution is strongly dependent on the monetary valuation of human 
life. Welfare losses in southern regions of Europe are estimated to be several times larger compared 
to those in the north. Limiting warming to 2°C would halve economic impacts compared to a 3°C 
scenario, while achieving the stringent Paris target of 1.5°C would lower welfare loss by 75%.  
 
Quantifying economic impacts of climate change 
The economic analysis was done for seven impact categories: river floods, coastal floods, agriculture, energy 
supply, droughts, windstorms and human mortality from extreme heat and cold. It is very important to stress 
that the economic assessment of climate impacts is incomplete: the four other climate impacts categories of 
the PESETA IV project were not considered because these impacts could not be monetized (e.g., loss of alpine 
tundra, shift in ecological domains). There are other relevant climate impacts whose economic valuation is not 
possible given the current state-of-the-art. That is for example the case for effects associated with crossing 
climate tipping points, ecosystems degradation and loss of habitats and species. Therefore, the integrated 
economic impacts presented here do not constitute the totality of economic impacts of climate change in Europe 
and the UK.  
The economic analysis was made with a general equilibrium model in a comparative static context, in which we 
evaluated how different levels of global warming would affect the economy as of today. Hence the results 
estimated address the question: "How would the current economy be affected if 1.5°C, 2°C and 3°C of global 
warming would occur today?" This method avoids making assumptions about demographic trends and the future 
structure and size of the economy and allows to report results that are due to climate change only. 
 
Economic impacts of the damages considered 
Exposing present economy to global warming of 3°C would result in an annual welfare loss of at least 175 
€billion (1.38% of GDP) for the seven impact categories considered in PESETA IV (Figure 31). Under a 2°C 
scenario the welfare loss would be 83 €billion/year (0.65% of GDP), while restricting warming to 1.5°C would 
reduce welfare loss to 42 €billion/year (0.33% of GDP).  
The estimated welfare loss with 2°C global warming is very similar to that in PESETA III, which also covered 
labour productivity and energy demand but not drought and energy supply. PESETA III further estimated a 
welfare loss of 1.92% of GDP for a high warming scenario of 4°C. Findings of PESETA III and IV therefore 
corroborate that welfare loss in the EU increases with the level of global warming.   
 
Sectoral impacts 
Human mortality from extreme heat dominates the (incomplete) aggregated economic impacts. The related 
welfare loss reaches 36, 65 and 122 €billion at 1.5°C, 2°C and 3°C global warming, respectively. More than 
80% of the mortality related welfare loss is estimated for southern EU regions. It should be noted that the 
share of human mortality loss to the total economic impact depends strongly on the appreciation of the 
economic value of life.  
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Figure 31. Welfare loss (% of GDP) from considered climate impacts at warming levels for the EU and the UK, and for 
macro regions (see Approach). The results represent change in welfare if warming levels would act upon current economy, 
compared to current economy under present climate. 
 
River and coastal floods are the second most significant source of welfare loss in the EU, particularly in northern 
and central EU regions (Figure 32). Flooding impacts constitute 8.5 €billion of welfare loss with 1.5°C global 
warming, which increases to 16 €billion with 2°C and 40 €billion with 3°C global warming. It should be noted 
that sea levels will continue to rise long after climate has stabilised at a specific warming level, e.g. sea levels 
with 2°C in 2160 will be much higher than with 2°C in 2060. This means that coastal flood impacts projected 
here for a warming level are very conservative.      
 
 
 
Figure 32. Welfare loss (% of GDP) from considered climate impacts excluding human mortality at warming levels for 
the EU and the UK, and for macro regions (see Approach). The results represent change in welfare if warming levels would 
act upon current economy, compared to current economy under present climate.  
 
 58 
Changes in drought impacts lead to an increase in welfare in northern Europe, but become a source of welfare 
reduction in southern and western EU regions. With 1.5°C global warming the overall welfare loss from drought 
is limited to 0.7 €billion, but it grows to 10.6 €billion with 3°C global warming. Changes in agriculture yield also 
result in an increase in welfare in the north and a reduction in the south of Europe. For the EU and UK this 
results to a small positive welfare effect at low levels of warming (1.5°C and 2°C), which is reversed at higher 
levels of warming (3°C). The energy model simulates a positive effect of global warming on energy supply in 
the north and an opposite trend in the south. These regional effects are balanced at 1.5°C and result in a small 
increase in EU welfare at 2°C and 3°C global warming. 
 
The north-south divide 
There is a clear north-south divide in the regional distribution of welfare losses. The sum of impacts in northern 
regions are relatively small or even positive (e.g. northern Europe with 1.5°C and 2°C) as these regions 
experience gains from climate change for some of the sectors considered (agriculture, drought, energy supply). 
In southern EU regions the impacts are mostly negative. As a result, aggregated welfare losses in southern 
regions are several times larger compared to those in the north of Europe. 
 
Spill-over effects from climate impacts in the rest of the world 
The EU is not only affected by climate change impacting upon its economy, but also indirectly through 
international trade with countries that also experience climate-related damages. The findings of PESETA IV 
confirm a more comprehensive analysis performed in PESETA III, which showed that international spill-over 
effects could increase the internal EU welfare loss by approximately 20%.  
 
Approach 
The economic analysis has been made with a multi-sector, multi-country computable general equilibrium model 
(Climate assessment General Equilibrium, CaGE model) that integrates the various climate impact channels in 
a consistent way. The CaGE model was applied in a comparative static context, where future climate affects 
the economy as of today. The resulting estimates thus address the question: "How would today’s economy be 
affected if global warming would occur today?"  
Some of the main features of the interface between the damages for impact categories and the economic 
modelling include damage to capital stock, sectoral productivity reduction, and change in consumption.  
The economic consequences are estimated in terms of welfare (consumption) changes using as input the direct 
damage estimates from the different impact categories. This includes damage to capital stock, sectoral 
productivity reduction, and changes in consumption. Welfare loss is in general larger than the direct damages 
because it accounts for indirect effects in the rest of the sectors of the economy (e.g. agricultural yield losses 
impacting the agro-food industry). Welfare loss is expressed in € (2015 value) as well as a share (in %) of GDP. 
Climate impacts happening in the rest of the world will also affect the EU via international trade. In PESETA IV 
the possible scale of international spill-overs due to impacts in the agriculture sector in the rest of the world is 
simulated with the CaGE model. More details in Szewczyk et al. (2020).  
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16 Limitations and way forward 
The PESETA IV approach offers a number of advantages, including consistency in the use of socioeconomic and 
climate change scenarios across a wide range of sectoral impact and damage models. Nevertheless, modelling 
future climate impacts at the European continental scale involves inevitable simplifications, with considerable 
uncertainties in the models and datasets representing climate change, exposure and vulnerability of 
ecosystems, people and economic sectors. The main limitations are discussed below. Limitations specific to the 
individual impact assessments are described in the Technical Reports of each impact analysis, as well as in the 
scientific literature underlying the analyses. Ongoing and future work to address these limitations will 
strengthen the estimates presented in this report, including a broader coverage of impact categories and the 
use of ranges and confidence intervals.  
 
Emission pathways, warming levels and climate projections 
The project assumes that impacts at a certain warming level can be derived from transient climate projections, 
rather than climate projections that stabilise once a warming level is reached. By considering two RCPs, the 
uncertainty in the pathway to reach the warming levels is partly accounted for, but possible delayed effects on 
climate and consequent impacts after climate stabilisation are not accounted for. Current literature suggests 
that for most climate variables these effects are smaller than the variability in the climate projections. The time 
dimension, however, remains critical for time-delayed processes such as sea level rise, which will continue long 
after climate has stabilised at a certain warming level.  
The use of two RCPs and a climate ensemble with 22 model realisations aims to characterise the uncertainty 
regarding future climate projections. However, the ensemble might still underrepresent the real uncertainty in 
future climate conditions. 
Climate projections show bias in reproducing present climate. Bias-correction is applied to adjust for this, but 
this requires high-resolution observations of past climate conditions. This is currently only feasible for 
temperature and precipitation, while other variables required by some impact models are not corrected.   
 
Coverage of impacts  
The project is not comprehensive in the coverage of climate impacts in Europe. Even if eleven important climate 
impact mechanisms have been assessed, many potential consequences of global warming are not quantified. 
Impacts on terrestrial ecosystems and their services are only partially captured, while those on aquatic and 
marine ecosystems are not assessed. Climate change will impact food production beyond crop production, 
including effects on livestock, fisheries and aquaculture. Impacts on human health are not limited to mortality 
from temperature extremes, but also include effects on human mortality and morbidity from less extreme non-
optimum background temperatures, air quality, and water- and vector-borne diseases. Sea level rise and rising 
coastal extremes will also result in increased erosion, loss of coastal ecosystems, saltwater intrusion and 
damage to port and maritime transport infrastructure. Apart from river flooding that is considered, climate 
change will affect pluvial and flash flooding from local intense precipitation. The PESETA IV energy analysis 
focuses on energy supply, while climate change will also drive changes in the demand for energy. Impacts on 
key economic sectors such as transport, tourism and labour productivity are not evaluated. Climate change 
could further induce the displacement of people, increase the risk of conflicts and have effects on security, yet 
it is very challenging to assess these consequences. Climate tipping points, or thresholds that, if passed, could 
have irreversible and catastrophic consequences, are also not considered. The project performed assessments 
of impacts for several climate extremes (heat and cold waves, drought, windstorms, river and coastal flooding), 
yet some sector impact analysis (e.g., energy supply, agriculture) do not fully capture the effects of such 
extremes and changes therein. Finally, due to the spatial domain challenges this would pose to the modelling 
activities, PESETA IV does not cover impacts in the EU’s outermost regions.  
 
Adaptation modelling 
Modelling adaptation, especially at pan-European scale also remains a challenging task. The costs and benefits 
of adaptation are explicitly modelled for two impact categories only. Future work could try to include adaptation 
modelling for a wider range of impact categories. Such assessments should mainstream the involved policy 
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areas, considering also stakeholders and users (both private and public), who currently face the adaptation 
challenge.  
Including all these issues would provide a more complete understanding of the totality of risk posed by climate 
change on the EU and the potential for mitigation and adaptation to reduce or avoid impacts.  
The cost-benefit analysis of adaptation remains also a challenging area, whose results are highly sensitive to 
many implementation choices, such as the discounting of investment costs in the shorter-term vs adaptation 
benefits that grow in time.  
 
Uncertainty in impacts  
Results in this report are primarily presented as point estimates that reflect the most likely outcome of the 
ensemble projections. For some sectors, ranges are provided based on the spread in the climate model 
projections. Uncertainties in the estimated biophysical impacts due to the conceptualisation and 
parameterisation of biophysical models is not accounted for as only one model is used per impact category. 
Using an ensemble of biophysical impact models, as done by the Inter-Sectoral Impact Model Intercomparison 
Project1, might better represent the uncertainty of the biophysical impacts.  
The economic valuation of impacts is another major source of uncertainty, in large because of the paucity of 
observations on losses in many sectors. This affects both the estimation of baseline economic losses and their 
projections under future climate and socioeconomic scenarios. Information regarding the physical and economic 
impacts of past climate and weather events, with a high spatial resolution, is required to improve the 
conceptualisation, calibration and validation of the various impact models. However, data collection and 
recording in Europe is heterogeneous and the available loss databases vary in their level of completeness and 
detail, or are not publicly available. Available information from national sources has to be homogenised and 
made available for climate impact research in order to better assess the scale and scope of climate risk in 
Europe.  
It is therefore important to stress that PESETA IV results are not to be interpreted as forecasts or predictions of 
climate impacts for specific local areas, regions or countries. In particular, the purpose of this study is not to 
make a climate impact and adaptation assessment for EU member states, regions or cities. Rather, its purpose 
is to provide a pan-European perspective of the main patterns of climate impacts and potential of adaptation.  
The further exploration of uncertainties in the risk analyses, including the development of probabilistic impact 
projections and representation of tail (low probability high impact) risk, will further strengthen the PESETA IV 
results. 
 
Further integration across models 
Some of the models are soft-linked mainly by using the output of one biophysical model as an input in another 
model (e.g. connection between water model and energy supply model: the hydrological simulations are used 
to assess the hydropower potentials). Furthermore, there exists a series of overlaps in the coverage of sectoral 
impacts for some of the biophysical models (e.g. impacts in the agriculture sector are considered also in the 
drought analysis). 
 
Addressing those issues would require additional integration between the models. The plan is to identify the 
most relevant interconnections between the models (i.e. those that can substantially change the results) and 
try to improve the integration of the overall JRC PESETA modelling system. Past experience in integrated 
assessment models can be very useful in this respect. 
 
                                           
1 https://www.isimip.org/ 
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